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Abstract 
Many people die of conditions caused by unhealthy behavior. Governments and 
health agencies fight unhealthy behavior through public health messages, but these 
messages are least effective for precisely the individuals they are designed to reach: those 
at high risk. Self-affirmation theory suggests that at-risk individuals become defensive 
toward health messages to protect their sense of self-integrity. Prior research shows that 
self-affirmation interventions—interventions designed to bolster self-integrity—produce 
positive change in measures reflecting the depth at which a health message is processed. 
Despite this empirical success, it has not been possible to verify that self-affirmation 
interventions are effective because they target self-integrity. We tested the efficacy of an 
alternate intervention—mindfulness—that could potentially decrease defensiveness 
toward health information without targeting self-integrity. A second aim was to test 
whether three candidate moderators—trait mindfulness, self-esteem, and activity in the 
behavioral activation system—in fact co-varied with the interventions or with change in 
the dependent variables. Sexually-active undergraduate students (N = 103) from Drexel 
University were administered a self-affirmation (n = 37), mindfulness (n = 33), or control 
(n = 33) intervention, watched a health message about risk for sexually transmitted 
infection, and then completed four dependent measures to assess the depth at which they 
had processed the health message. Surprisingly, neither participants in the self-
affirmation nor mindfulness conditions showed enhanced message processing relative to 
control participants. Also, none of the candidate moderators meaningfully co-varied with 
the interventions. We discuss the null findings in this adequately powered study in light 
v 
of two recent meta-analyses showing that self-affirmation produces smaller and more 
inconsistent effects in a health message context than the earlier literature suggested.
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Forty percent of Americans die from conditions caused by unhealthy behavior, 
such as smoking, eating poorly, failing to exercise, consuming excess alcohol, or 
engaging in risky sexual practices (McGinnis, 1993; Mokdad, Marks, Stroup, & 
Gerderbing, 2004). In an effort to reduce unhealthy behavior, governments and health 
agencies often conduct media campaigns that warn of the costs of unhealthy behavior. A 
familiar example in the United States is the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) 
campaign. At its peak, D.A.R.E. was implemented in about half of schools nationwide. 
Its core curriculum consumed 45-50 minutes of class time per week, sometimes in 
multiple classes per school (Ennett et al., 1994). More recently, in 2014, the FDA 
launched the $115 million Real Cost initiative, a media campaign designed to alert 
teenagers to the dangers of smoking (Fox, 2014).  
To our knowledge, no statistics tabulate the total resources spent each year on 
media campaigns such as D.A.R.E. and Real Cost. However, as these examples illustrate, 
the costs are substantial. Unfortunately, media campaigns vary widely in their 
effectiveness. Many campaigns are only moderately or marginally effective (Wakefield, 
Loken, & Hornik, 2010) and a few are actually harmful (Werch & Owen, 2002). This 
variable effectiveness may derive in part from the fact that health media campaigns must 
compete against myriad other media for viewers’ attention (Randolph & Viswanth, 
2004). Thus, media campaign messages must capture viewers’ attention and be delivered 
at opportune times in order to be effective. However, even well-timed and attention-
grabbing messages appear subject to psychological factors that can impair their 
effectiveness. 
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1.1 Psychological Influences on Health Messages 
The best-studied psychological influence on message effectiveness is the risk 
status of the message recipient. Dozens of studies show that individuals who are at high-
risk process health messages that could alert them to their risk more superficially than 
low-risk individuals (reviewed in Riet & Ruiter, 2013). High-risk individuals have been 
found to spend less time reading health information (Brown & Locker, 2009), to 
disengage their attention from it more quickly (Kessels et al., 2010), to exhibit skepticism 
toward it (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992), to suppress thoughts related 
to it (Nielsen & Shapiro, 2009), to judge it as more inaccurate (Croyle, Sun, & Louie, 
1993), and to rate people who are similar to themselves, but not themselves, as at high 
risk (Weinstein & Klein, 1995). Ironically, high-risk individuals are precisely the 
individuals whom health campaigns strive to reach, as they are typically the individuals 
most likely to benefit from changing their behavior (Rothman, Klein, & Weinstein, 
1996).  
Psychological traits also influence how health information is perceived. People 
with high self-esteem deny their health risks and rationalize their risky behaviors to a 
greater extent than those with low self-esteem (Gerrard, Gibbons, Reis-Bergan, & 
Russell, 2000; Boney-McCoy, Gibbons, & Gerrard, 1999). Approach-oriented people 
respond best to health messages about the benefits of a behavior, whereas avoidance-
oriented people respond best to messages about the dangers of failing to perform the 
behavior (Mann, Sherman, & Updegraff, 2004). And self-affirmation interventions—
psychological interventions designed to fortify self-integrity—appear to promote deeper 
processing of health information (reviewed in Epton, Harris, Kane, van Koningsbruggen, 
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& Sheeren, 2015; Sweeney & Moyer, 2015). Collectively, these findings suggest that 
psychological factors are important determinants of the effectiveness of health messages.  
1.2 Self-Affirmation Theory and Health Messages 
Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988; Cohen & Sherman, 2014) provides a 
psychological account of why high-risk individuals process health information more 
superficially than low-risk individuals (Riet & Ruiter, 2013; Cohen & Sherman, 2014). 
Self-affirmation theory posits that people are intrinsically motivated to protect their self-
integrity: to preserve a view of themselves as moral, capable, and integral. Thus, the 
theory suggests that any information that challenges this view will be perceived as 
threatening (Steele, 1988). In a health context, self-affirmation theory predicts that 
individuals will avoid, disengage from, and forget health information in proportion to 
how dangerous that they anticipate remembering and accepting such information would 
be to their sense of self-integrity (Riet & Ruiter, 2013). Health information could be 
perceived as a threat to self-integrity in at least two ways. First, health information may 
imply physical risk and, by extension, threat to the continued existence of the self (Cohen 
& Sherman, 2014). Second, high-risk individuals who accept their health risk must often 
acknowledge having engaged in risky behavior (Riet & Ruiter, 2013). For example, 
acknowledging that one is at high risk for a sexually transmitted infection typically 
requires accepting that one has engaged in risky sexual behavior. Perhaps this 
acknowledgement threatens one’s sense of oneself as competent, moral, and capable 
(Riet & Ruiter, 2013). 
 A key axiom of self-affirmation theory is that people compute their sense of self-
integrity through a single, global valuation: a scalar (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). That is, 
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although people evaluate their successes, failures, beliefs, and actions in specific 
domains, such as relationships and academics, they ultimately integrate these domain-
specific appraisals into a global sense of self-integrity (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). A 
corollary of this axiom is that self-integrity is fungible across domains. A negative 
appraisal in one domain can be compensated for by an equally positive appraisal in 
another domain, with no net change in self-integrity. For example, it may be possible to 
feel better about receiving bad grades (academic domain) by remembering that one has a 
strong network of friends (relationship domain).  
The notion that sense of self-integrity is fungible leads to an experimental 
prediction. An individual who is induced to recall strengths in one domain should find it 
easier to weather challenge in another domain. This prediction has been confirmed by 
numerous studies (reviewed in Cohen & Sherman, 2014). The most common 
manipulation in these studies asks participants to consider or write about an important 
personal value. The manipulation aims to focus participants on their worth in the valued 
domain. According to self-affirmation theory, this increased sense of worth in the valued 
domain should relieve the need to defend against threat in another domain. That is 
exactly what has been found (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). In a health context, at-risk 
individuals who are induced to focus on important values, and who read a health 
message, recall more of the message, endorse greater intent to change behaviors 
identified as risky in the message, and engage in more change in target behaviors after the 
experiment than individuals in control conditions (Armitage, Harris, Hepton, & Napper, 
2008; Cooke, Trebaczyk, Harris, & Wright, 2014; Crocker, Niiya, Mischkowski, 2008; 
Dillard, McCaul, & Magnan, 2005; Falk et al., 2015a; Ferrer, Shmueli, Bergman, Harris, 
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& Klein, 2012; Harris & Napper, 2005; Harris, Mayle, Mabbot, & Napper, 2007; Klein & 
Harris, 2009; Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000).  
1.2.1. Where is the Self-Integrity Protection in Self-Affirmation? Self-
affirmation theory has had significant empirical success, insofar as hundreds of studies 
have shown that people who undergo self-affirmation interventions become less 
defensive in the face of threatening information (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). However, it 
has never been possible to directly observe self-protective processes that become 
activated in the face of threat in order to protect self-integrity, as conceived by Steele 
(1988) in his seminal article on self-affirmation theory:  
I propose a self-system that… explains ourselves, and the world at large, to 
ourselves. The purpose of these constant explanations…is to maintain a 
phenomenal experience of the self…as adaptively and morally adequate, that is, 
as competent, coherent, unitary, stable, capable of free choice, capable of 
controlling important outcomes, and so on. I view these self-affirmation processes 
as being activated by information that threatens the perceived adequacy or 
integrity of the self and as running their course until this perception is restored, 
through explanation, rationalization, and/or action (p. 262). 
Rather than directly observing self-protective processes, self-affirmation theorists 
have inferred the presence of these processes from two types of studies (Cohen & 
Sherman, 2014). The first type of study shows that people become defensive after even 
minor events, such as a favored politician or sports team losing (Sherman & Cohen, 
2006). These studies are interpreted as showing that people personally identify with 
organizations such as political parties (Cohen et al., 2007) and sports teams (Cornil & 
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Chandon, 2013). Thus, even a small threat to the organization or party is taken as a 
personal threat, and thus elicits defensiveness. The theory also suggests that people can 
identify with abstract entities, such as ideologies, beliefs, and prior actions, and that they 
become defensive when these entities are threatened. For example, in a health context, 
the notion that people identify with prior actions has been used to explain why people 
will view as particularly threatening any information that suggests they have put 
themselves at risk (Riet & Ruiter, 2013). 
On the other hand, numerous studies outside of the self-affirmation literature have 
shown that people become defensive in the face of even minor threats. In fact, paradigms 
that evoke defensiveness through minor threat are ubiquitous in social psychology. 
Proulx, Inzlicht, and Harmon-Jones (2012) identified 10 major social psychological 
theories that explain why people react strongly to minor threats or inconsistencies. Each 
of these theories implicates an apparently distinct process or set of processes to explain 
these reactions. For example, system justification theory holds that people are inherently 
biased to maintain the status quo, and thus engage in efforts to restore the status quo 
when it is challenged (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). The meaning maintenance model 
states that people desire coherence and meaning, and thus work to restore coherence 
whenever it has been threatened (Park, 2010). Terror management theory postulates that 
people are motivated to avoid reminders of mortality, and thus work to distance 
themselves from such reminders (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Sheldon, Psyzczynski, & Lyon, 
1989). The uncertainty management model maintains that people are motivated to relieve 
uncertainty, and thus will assert fairness when faced with uncertainty (van den Bos, 
2001). Like self-affirmation theory, each of these theories is supported by a large 
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empirical literature. And each theory identifies a putatively different process than self-
protection to explain defensive or compensatory responses in the face of threat or 
inconsistency. 
The second type of study providing evidence for self-integrity protection shows 
that people become defensive when they are induced to affirm an important aspect of 
themselves (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). As discussed, in a health context, individuals who 
complete a self-affirmation intervention are more apt to encode health information and 
recall it later, and are also more likely to change their behavior in response to such 
information (Epton et al., 2015; Sweeney & Moyer, 2015). In other contexts, self-
affirmation manipulations have been shown to make people more willing to acknowledge 
wrongs inflicted by their in-group on another group (Čehajić–Clancy et al., 2011), to 
cause low self-esteem individuals to feel more supported in their relationships (Marigold, 
Holmes, & Ross, 2007), and to decrease the pernicious effect of identifying with a 
negatively-stereotyped group on academic performance (Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, & Master, 
2006; Yeager & Walton, 2011). 
However, recent studies challenge the idea that these effects are mediated by 
enhanced sense of self-integrity. Crocker and colleagues found that a self-affirmation 
intervention made smokers more accepting of health information that informed them of 
their risk. However, these effects were mediated by feelings of love and connectedness 
toward others rather than by changes in self-directed feelings (Crocker et al., 2008). 
Ferrer and colleagues found that self-affirmed college drinkers were more intent to 
reduce their drinking than non-drinkers after seeing a message that informed them of the 
risks of alcohol. However, these effects depended on the affirmed participants exhibiting 
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positive affect after the message; affirmed participants who exhibited negative affect 
following the message were no more intent to change than non-affirmed individuals 
(Ferrer et al., 2012). 
In sum, self-affirmation interventions have consistently produced desirable 
change in a variety of areas, but it has been difficult to verify that this change occurs 
because of reduced need for self-integrity protection. Specifically, it is not possible to 
directly observe self-protective dynamics and, thus, it cannot be directly verified that 
people become defensive to protect their self-integrity. Nor has it been confirmed that 
self-affirmation interventions are effective because the interventions relieve the need to 
protect self-integrity. This challenge in mind, it is important to consider other 
interventions that could plausibly help at-risk individuals surmount psychological barriers 
to processing threatening health information. It is quite plausible that other interventions 
could help cope with threat without bolstering sense of self-integrity. As discussed in the 
next section, alternate interventions may be more feasible than self-affirmation 
interventions to deliver in realistic clinical settings. 
1.3 Mindfulness Meditation 
 We propose mindfulness meditation as a plausible alternate intervention for 
increasing receptivity toward threatening health information. Mindfulness has been 
defined as regulating attention, in particular paying attention to internal sensations such 
as thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations; and as regarding the various sensations that 
compose one’s experience non-judgmentally and with a sense of curiosity and openness 
(Bishop et al., 2004). Mindfulness meditation is an established method of cultivating this 
psychological state. Mindfulness meditation is sometimes taught in courses and retreats 
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that last weeks or months. However, short mindfulness interventions administered in 
single sessions to untrained individuals have produced beneficial effects in various 
domains, for example, enhancing persistence on difficult tasks, and decreasing the 
prevalence of intrusive thoughts (Levin, Hildrenbrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 2012). 
As noted above, a large literature shows that high-risk individuals process 
threatening health information more superficially than low-risk individuals. The various 
psychological theories put forward to account for these effects differ in their details 
(reviewed in Riet & Ruiter, 2013), but all accounts agree that superficial processing 
occurs to allay anxiety or to diminish threat of one kind or another. Mindfulness 
interventions coach individuals to attend non-judgmentally to their experience. Thus, 
these interventions may enhance the ability to tolerate anxiety that is elicited by 
threatening health information. In particular, mindfulness interventions may prime 
continued redirection toward the message, when the natural inclination absent 
intervention is to withdraw. 
If mindfulness interventions facilitate processing of threatening health 
information, this finding would have immediate implications for clinical practice. In 
particular, the finding would broaden the armamentarium of clinicians delivering health 
information in clinical settings. To give just one example, imagine a behavioral health 
counselor who has just assessed her client’s drinking habits. She now wishes to inform 
her client that his habits put him at risk, and she hopes to work with him to develop a plan 
for behavior change. It is difficult to envision how the clinician in this scenario could 
prime her client’s values through a self-affirmation intervention. On the other hand, if her 
prior work with the client has included teaching mindfulness meditation, it may be quite 
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feasible for her to practice meditation or a mindfulness exercise at some point during her 
session with him. 
1.4 Possible Moderators  
In addition to testing the efficacy of mindfulness as an alternate intervention, it 
would be useful to know whether mindfulness or self-affirmation is more effective for 
some individuals than others. In particular, it is plausible that three psychological 
constructs—trait mindfulness, self-esteem, and activity in the behavioral activation 
system (BAS)—will co-vary with the effectiveness of the interventions. 
1.4.1. Trait Mindfulness. As discussed, brief mindfulness interventions have 
produced desirable outcomes in a variety of domains (Levin et al., 2012), and a brief 
mindfulness meditation intervention is a candidate alternate intervention to self-
affirmation in a health message context. However, it is possible that such an intervention 
will be most effective for individuals who are high in trait mindfulness. Individuals who 
rate themselves high in mindfulness presumably have recourse to mindfulness skills that 
they can deploy when cued to do so by a brief intervention. In contrast, low-mindfulness 
individuals do not, by definition, have recourse to the same skills. In contrast to this 
plausible moderating effect of trait mindfulness within the context of a brief mindfulness 
intervention, there is little reason to suspect that mindfulness will moderate the effect of a 
self-affirmation intervention, because self-affirmation has no clear theoretical link to trait 
mindfulness. 
1.4.2. Self-esteem. Self-affirmation theory predicts that self-affirmation 
interventions should have a more pronounced effect for individuals who have high self-
esteem, because these individuals have a stronger sense of self to protect (Steele, 
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Spencer, & Lynch, 1993). High self-esteem individuals should therefore feel more 
affirmed by self-affirmation interventions than low self-esteem individuals, and thus 
should have reduced need to defend themselves when given the opportunity to self-
affirm. The effect of self-affirmation interventions should depend on self-esteem. In 
practice, self-esteem has been an inconsistent moderator in self-affirmation studies 
(McQueen & Klein, 2006). The juxtaposition of mindfulness and self-esteem 
interventions offers an opportunity to gain clarity on the importance of self-esteem for 
self-affirmation interventions. Mindfulness has no clear theoretical link to sense of self-
integrity. If self-affirmation operates by bolstering sense of self-integrity, but mindfulness 
does not, then self-affirmation should be more effective for high compared to low self-
esteem individuals, whereas the effects of a mindfulness intervention should not depend 
on self-esteem. 
 1.4.3. BAS Activity. The BAS refers to the brain system that mobilizes response 
to reward (Carver & White, 1994) and threat (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). A series of 
studies by Ian McGregor and colleagues provides evidence that threatening information 
(such as information that pertains to personal health risk) activates the BAS, and that the 
magnitude of activation positively correlates with defensiveness to the threat (McGregor, 
2006; McGregor, Haji, Teper, & Nash, 2008; McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2009; 
McGregor, Nash, & Prentice, 2010; McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2013; Nash, 
McGregor, & Inzlicht, 2010).  
1.4.3.1. Measuring the BAS. The BAS has a complex neural architecture that 
consists of interacting cortical and subcortical regions (Corr & McNaughton, 1994). 
However, studies of brain injured patients (Sackheim et al., 1982) and lesioned animals 
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(Blanchard & Blanchard, 1989) show that hypoactivity in the left compared to right 
frontal lobe is, by itself, sufficient to produce deficits in approach behavior. This early 
research prompted more recent studies of natural variations in left-relative-to-right frontal 
lobe activity among healthy individuals, and of the effect of these individual differences 
on approach behavior. Researchers have primarily used electroencephalography (EEG) to 
study these differences. EEG can be used to study relative frontal lobe activity because 
power in a specific electrical frequency band, alpha, appears to roughly track the inverse 
of neural activity; that is, higher alpha emanating from a certain neural region is 
associated with less activity in that region (Allen & Cohen, 2010; Jensen & Mazaheri, 
2010). Researchers have discovered that higher alpha at left-relative-to-right frontal 
electrode sites is associated with decreased approach behavior (e.g., Henriques & 
Davidson, 1991; Stewart, Bismark, Towers, Coan, & Allen, 2010). Because alpha 
appears to be inversely associated with neural activity (Allen & Cohen, 2010), these 
findings nicely mirror the classic studies on lesioned animals and brain-injured patients 
that revealed left frontal hypoactivity produces deficits in approach behavior. 
Although alpha activity assessed via EEG is the most established method of 
measuring individual differences in trait-like BAS activity, EEG is unavailable in most 
clinical settings. Moreover, even when it is available, it is quite time-consuming to 
administer and analyze. Recent research suggests that a simple line bisection task (LBT) 
can also detect relative left frontal lobe activity, and thus BAS activity (McGregor, Nash, 
Phills, & Mann, 2010; Nash, McGregor, & Inzlicht, 2010; but see also Leggett, Thomas, 
& Nicholls, 2015). The LBT is a simple, pen-and-paper measure, in which participants 
mark the estimated midpoint of a series of staggered lines. The LBT was developed as a 
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neuropsychology measure of visual hemifield blindness (Jewell & McCourt, 2000); 
patients who are blind over a hemifield ignore some portion of the line, and thus mark a 
“midpoint” through the truncated portion of the line that is visible to them. However, the 
studies by Nash and colleagues suggest that the LBT also has utility as a measure of BAS 
activity among healthy individuals. Specifically, when healthy individuals mark an 
estimated midpoint, the extent to which their responses deviate on average to the left or 
right of the line appears to reflect BAS activity (McGregor et al., 2010a; Nash et al., 
2010). Importantly, the LBT can be easily exported to clinical settings, because it can be 
rapidly administered (it usually takes less than a minute to complete) and has low demand 
characteristics (it is hard to imagine naïve participants inferring the link between 
deviations on the LBT and the extent to which they are defensive against threatening 
information). 
1.5 Current Study 
Prior studies have shown that individuals who undergo self-affirmation 
interventions process threatening health messages at greater depth than individuals in 
control conditions (Epton et al., 2015; Sweeney & Moyer, 2015). Depth of processing is 
typically operationalized through a suite of measures that assess, for example, 
participants’ recall of the message, or their intent-to-change their behavior after the 
message. To ensure that participants are administered messages that are personally 
significant, and thus potentially threatening, researchers typically recruit at-risk 
participants. For example, Crocker and colleagues recruited smokers and presented them 
with information about the harms of smoking (Crocker et al., 2008, study 2). 
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Building on this prior research establishing the efficacy of self-affirmation in 
facilitating health message processing, the current study compared self-affirmation to an 
active novel intervention—mindfulness—that had never before been tested in a health 
message context. Both interventions were compared to a control condition. Intervention 
assignments were between-subject. The primary aim of the study was to examine whether 
the interventions would be more effective than the control condition at facilitating 
processing.  
A secondary aim was to examine whether the different interventions were more 
effective for some individuals than others. Three potential moderators were collected. As 
discussed, two of the moderators (trait mindfulness and self-esteem) were collected to 
help determine whether the mindfulness or self-affirmation interventions are more 
effective for some individuals than others. The third moderator—BAS activity, as 
assessed by the LBT—was collected to help determine the utility of the LBT as an 
indicator of depth of health information processing, across conditions.  
The health message delivered in this study provided information about risk for 
sexually transmitted infection (STI). All participants were college students, and nearly all 
were sexually active (discussed below). This selection procedure ensured that the STI 
information was personally relevant and potentially threatening. To operationalize depth 
of health processing, we adapted four dependent variables (DVs) from prior self-
affirmation studies (Armitage, Harris, Epton, & Napper, 2008; Harris & Napper, 2005; 
Sherman et al., 2000) so that they pertained to sexual health. The DVs will be discussed 
in more detail in Methods; however, it is important to note here that each DV was 
designed to reflect some facet of depth of health message processing. Thus, for brevity 
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and conceptual clarity, each hypothesis below uses the term “deeper processing” (or 
variants thereof) to signify change in this set of four DVs. 
1.6 Hypotheses 
1.6.1. Primary aim: Examine Intervention Effects 
Hypothesis 1: Participants in the mindfulness condition will show deeper processing of 
health information than participants in the control condition. 
Hypothesis 2: Participants in the self-affirmation condition will show deeper processing 
of health information than participants in the control condition. 
Hypothesis 3: There will be no clinically meaningful differences in depth of processing 
between participants in the mindfulness and self-affirmation conditions. 
1.6.2. Secondary aim: Examine Moderator Effects 
Hypothesis 4: Increase in BAS activity (from pre- to post-intervention) will be inversely 
associated with depth of processing (as assessed through the DVs). That is, people who 
show a decrease or smaller relative increase in BAS activity will process the health 
information at greater depth relative to those who show a large increase. 
Hypothesis 5: In the mindfulness condition, trait mindfulness will be positively associated 
with depth of health information processing, but no such effect will be evident in the self-
affirmation or control conditions. 
Hypothesis 6: In the self-affirmation condition, self-esteem will be positively associated 
with depth of health information processing, but no such effect will be evident in the 
mindfulness or control conditions. 
Exploratory Hypothesis: Individuals in both the mindfulness and self-affirmation 
conditions will show a smaller increase in BAS activity after the health message than 
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controls. This hypothesis is only expected to hold if hypotheses 1 and 2 (mindfulness and 
self-affirmation are superior to control) and hypothesis 4 (greater depth of processing is 
associated with less increase in BAS) are confirmed. 
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Chapter 2: Methods 
2.1 Participants 
 One hundred and ten undergraduate students from Drexel University participated 
in this study. The study was approved by Drexel University’s Institutional Review Board. 
Recruitment materials specified that participants were required to be sexually active 
(defined as having at least one partner in the last year) in order to participate. However, a 
small portion of participants (7/110) noted, on a questionnaire administered once they 
arrived, that they were not sexually active. These seven individuals completed their visit 
but were excluded from data analyses; thus all information from this point forward 
pertains to the remaining 103 participants. Participants were predominantly female 
(66.4%) and ranged in age from 18 to 26 (M = 20.95, SD = 1.53). The racial and ethnic 
composition of the sample was as follows: 13.6% of participants identified as Asian, 67% 
as Caucasian, 6.8% as Black or African American, .97% as African, 1.9% as Carribean or 
Haitian, 3.9% as European, and 2.9% as other. 5.8% identified as Hispanic or Hispanic-
American.  
2.1.1. Recruitment. Recruitment was conducted through emails inviting 
participants to participate in an in-person study concerning how people respond to sexual 
health information. Participants were instructed to sign up for the study via SONA, an 
online research portal used by Drexel University.  
2.1.2. Exclusion Criteria.  As mentioned, recruitment materials specified that 
participants were required to be sexually active to participate in the study. 
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2.1 Procedure 
Participants signed up for the study via SONA by selecting from possible time 
slots posted by the experimenters. At the chosen time, participants were retrieved from a 
waiting room in Stratton Hall (on Drexel University’s main campus) by an experimenter. 
All experimenters were graduate students or research assistants at Drexel University. 
Experimenters obtained written consent from each participant. No record of participants’ 
names or other identifying information were maintained after the in-person visit.  
This study utilized a between-subjects intervention design and participants were 
randomly assigned to an intervention condition prior to their visit. The assignment 
determined the digital audio intervention that each participant listened to (explained 
below); otherwise, the procedure was the same for all participants. After consent, each 
participant filled out online questionnaires, hosted on the survey collection site Qualtrics 
(Qualtrics, Provo, UT), and also completed a baseline LBT (on paper). The online 
questionnaires consisted of the candidate moderators, and also the baseline estimation of 
risk DV (see Measures). 
Next, the experimenter informed the participant that he/she would be listening to 
a digital audio recording that would guide him/her through an exercise. Audio recordings 
were used so that intervention delivery was standardized. The experimenter played the 
participant a mindfulness, self-affirmation, or control condition audio recording, 
depending on the participant’s intervention assignment. While the recording played, the 
experimenter sat quietly in the corner of the room, out of the participant’s view. Each 
recording lasted between 16 and 17 minutes. The self-affirmation recording asked 
participants to write about their values, which is a standard form of self-affirmation 
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intervention that has been consistently shown to facilitate processing of threatening 
health information (Epton et al., 2015; Sweeney & Moyer, 2015). The mindfulness 
intervention guided participants through a meditation intervention. The control 
intervention—which was intended to have no active effects, but was otherwise matched 
in format to the self-affirmation and mindfulness interventions—contained information 
about Drexel University. Appendix B contains the intervention scripts. 
Once the recording was complete, the experimenter informed the participant that 
he/she would now view information about sexual health. The information was presented 
via a digital video recording of auto-advancing Powerpoint slides that lasted just over 
five minutes. The informational video included little-known, and potentially alarming, 
information about the prevalence rates and dangers of STI (obtained from CDC.gov). For 
example: more than one in three people in the United States have an STI; about half of 
new STI infections occur among people 15-24 years old; HIV is disproportionately 
common among 15-24 year olds; STI infection is a risk factor for the later development 
of cancer; about one in six people between the ages of 14 and 49 have genital herpes; and 
condoms only reduce the risk of genital herpes by about 50%, because genital herpes can 
spread through contact with genital areas or areas around the genitals that are not covered 
by condoms.  
Once the informational was complete, the experimenter asked the participant to 
fill out another paper LBT, and then a final set of online questionnaires. This final set 
included the questionnaire DVs, including the second estimation of risk DV (see 
Measures). After completing the questionnaires, participants were informed that the study 
was complete. At this point, the experimenter casually mentioned a pile of brochures 
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containing further information about STIs on the window sill near the participant, and 
informed the participant that he or she should feel free to take a brochure if interested. 
The experimenter surreptitiously recorded whether the participant took a brochure, and 
this choice served as one of the DVs (Measures). Participants were compensated one 
extra credit point through the SONA system for participating in the 45-minute study.  
Participants also had the option to complete a 10-15 minute online questionnaire 
two to three days after completing the in-person visit, for which they received another 
extra credit point. We did not analyze these later responses because few participants 
responded, and because we did not judge it likely, in retrospect, that the questionnaires in 
this second assessment would help achieve the primary or secondary aims. 
2.3 Measures  
Table I in Appendix A lists all measures and the assessment schedule.  
2.3.1. Moderators 
 Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ): The FFMQ (Baer, Smith, 
Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006) was used to assess trait mindfulness. The FFMQ 
is a 39-item questionnaire with five factors. The measure was designed to encompass 
facets of the mindfulness construct that were captured through various distinct 
mindfulness questionnaires in common use at the time the FFMQ was developed, but 
which had never before been aggregated into a single measure. The developers of the 
FFMQ administered several of the existing mindfulness measures to a broad sample of 
participants, and then reduced through factor analysis this group of previously distinct 
questionnaires in order to create the FFMQ. The FFMQ is thus considered a 
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comprehensive mindfulness measure that captures the most important and distinct facets 
of the construct. 
Items on the FFMQ are rated on a 5-point scale, ranging from “never or very 
rarely true” (1) to “very often or always true” (5). The five facets of the FFMQ have 
demonstrated adequate to good internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging 
from .75 to .91 (Baer et al., 2008). The facets have also shown good convergent validity, 
relating in the expected direction to a number of variables theorized to relate to 
mindfulness; for example, positive relationships with self-compassion (rs = .14 to .53) 
and emotional intelligence (rs = .22 to .60) and negative relationships with alexythmia 
(rs = -.08 to  -.68) and difficulties with emotion regulation (rs = -.02 to -.52). Higher 
scores on the FFMQ reflect higher trait mindfulness. 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES): The RSES (Rosenberg, 1965) was used to 
assess self-esteem. The RSES is a 10-item, single-factor scale designed to measure sense 
of self-worth. Items on the RSES are rated on a 4-point scale, ranging from “strongly 
disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4). For five of the items, a score of four indicates high 
self-esteem (e.g., “On the whole, I am satisfied with my self.”). For the remaining items, 
a score of four indicates low self-esteem (e.g., “I wish I could have more respect for my 
self.”); these last five items are reverse scored (Sinclair et al., 2010). Thus higher RSES 
scores reflect higher self-esteem. A recent, large sample (Sinclair et al., 2010, N = 503) 
study of the RSES, conducted among diverse groups, found that it demonstrated adequate 
item convergent validity, and strong item divergent validity. The scale also showed good 
to excellent internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .84 - .95 (Sinclair 
et al., 2010).  
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LBT: The line bisection task was developed as a neuropsychology measure of 
state hemispheric dominance (Jewell & McCourt, 2000). In this study, we used the 
adapted LBT developed by McGregor, Nash, and colleagues (Nash et al., 2010) to study 
state BAS activation in the face of threat (obtained from Nash by email). Nash and 
colleagues recently showed that LBT scores using this measure correlate with frontal 
alpha asymmetry as assessed by EEG (r = .38; Nash et al., 2010).  
 In the LBT, participants are presented with 14 staggered, 23-centimeter lines, on 
landscape view sheets of paper, and instructed to mark the estimated midpoint of each 
line.  
Leftward errors are scored as negative values, and rightward as positive values; leftward 
errors (negative values) are thought to reflect greater right-than-left frontal lobe 
dominance, and rightward errors (positive values) greater left-than-right frontal lobe 
dominance (Nash et al., 2010). Pre- and post-LBT scores are calculated by summing over 
the deviations on the fourteen lines. In this study, we calculated separate scores for the 
baseline and post-message LBTs. The first LBT measurement (baseline) was then 
subtracted from the second (post-message), creating a single score that reflects change 
from baseline to post-manipulation. 
To our knowledge, this was the first study that administered the LBT both before 
and after a manipulation expected to provoke defensiveness; other studies simply 
administered the measure after the manipulation. However, as discussed in the 
introduction, it is well-established, first, that people naturally vary in left-relative-right 
frontal activity, even at rest (i.e., with no manipulation), and, second, that this natural 
variation corresponds to meaningful individual differences in trait approach behavior. 
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Thus, a post-manipulation LBT measurement should capture both natural individual 
differences and the effects of the manipulation; it should be noisier than a measure that 
parcels out these individual differences. Thus, we collected both pre- and post- 
measurements, and subtracted pre- from post-, in order to isolate the effects of the 
manipulation. We hypothesized that this technique would allow a cleaner measurement of 
change in approach behavior elicited by the health message manipulation. 
2.3.2. Dependent Variables 
Following past studies (e.g., Sherman et al., 2000; Harris & Napper, 2005; 
Armitage et al., 2008), we designed four DVs to measure commonly-assessed facets of 
depth of health processing (risk perception, intent-to-change, recall of message, and 
willingness to learn more) by tailoring these measures to the health message about STI 
risk in the present study. Appendix C lists the full measures. 
DV1: Intent-to-change: Participants were asked to rate how often they anticipate 
performing some healthy or protective behavior, compared to how often they perform the 
behavior now. Participants could also rate “not applicable” in the event the behavior was 
irrelevant to them or they always perform the behavior now. Participants who process the 
health message at a deeper should show greater intent to change their behavior, reflected 
in higher scores on DV1. 
DV2: Recall of Information from Article: Participants were given a six-item 
multiple choice quiz about information from the article. Participants who process the 
health message at a deeper level should remember it better, reflected in higher scores on 
the quiz. 
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DV3: Estimated risk: Participants were asked to rate the probability, from 0 (no 
chance) to 100 (certain), that each of ten issues related to being personally affected by 
STIs will arise in their lifetimes. DV3 was administered pre- and post-message. 
Participants who process the health message at a deeper level should increase their 
estimation of risk, reflected in greater pre- to post- change in DV3. 
DV4: Willingness to Learn More about STIs: As detailed in Procedure, 
experimenters recorded whether participants took a pamphlet with further information 
about STIs when they were offered the opportunity to do so at the end of the experiment. 
This dichotomous data point (took or did not take the brochure) was used as a DV. 
Participants who process the health message at a deeper level should be more willing to 
learn about STIs, and thus should be more likely to take a pamphlet. 
2.4. Ethical Issues 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. Study staff ensured that 
participants understood that participation in the study was optional, and that they could 
discontinue at any point. There were no anticipated threats of adverse events, and as 
expected no adverse reactions were reported. Study data were kept in a secure, password-
protected computer housed in a locked research laboratory. Data were collected without 
identifying information and stored separately from informed consent documents. The 
informed consent documents contained no information that could link the names on the 
consent to a specific participant’s data. All data and informed consent forms will be 
stored for at least three years after the study’s completion, in compliance with Drexel 
University IRB guidelines. 
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2.5 Data Analysis  
 Data analysis was conducted in the statistical program R (r-project.org). 
 2.5.1. Pre-analysis Transformations 
 Summary statistics for each DV were created as follows. For DV2 (the multiple 
choice quiz), the number of correct items (out of 6 possible) were calculated. Following 
prior self-affirmation and health message studies (e.g., Harris & Napper, 2005; Sherman 
et al., 2000), we created mean or sum scores for the DVs with multiple items with 
numeric values, namely DVs 1 (intent-to-change) and 3 (estimated risk). As noted above, 
participants could select ‘not applicable’ (NA) on DV1 when a behavior was not 
pertinent to them. Thus, DV1 had a substantial number of non-numeric NA values (M = 
16.7, SD = 8.34 non-numeric values across the ten items in the measure). These values 
are not technically “missing,” because participants provided an answer. However, these 
data can be treated as missing at random (Schaefer & Graham, 2002), and thus are 
candidates for imputation. For this DV, imputation was essential prior to creating mean 
scores, because there was high variability across items; thus, absent imputation, the mean 
score for a given participant could be skewed if he/she had rated a certain item as not 
applicable, when his/her answer if the item did apply to him would likely have been 
significantly higher or lower than the DV mean. We therefore imputed missing values for 
DV1 using a random forests imputation algorithm created by Stekhoven and Buellmann 
(2014) that exhibits state-of-the-art performance. The algorithm was implemented in the 
‘missForest’ package in R.  
 In DV3, one participant’s data was deleted for apparent sloppy/random responding 
(he/she answered most risk questions as 0, and answered at pre-message that he/she 
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estimated a 98% chance of getting cancer as a result of having contracted chlamydia, 
whereas at post-message he/she estimated 0% chance of getting cancer as a result of 
having contracted chlamydia). Three items were missing from DV4 (willingness to learn 
more); these were cases in which the experimenter had been unable to determine whether 
the participant had taken a pamphlet or not. These missing cases in DVs 3 and 4 were 
simply dropped from analyses (rather than imputed) because only a small number of 
values were missing. Thirteen cases were missing from LBTs 1 and 2. Twelve were due 
to a printing error at the start of the study, which prevented accurate scoring of the first 
twelve participants’ LBTs. The last case was missing because the participant had a 
broken arm and thus could not fill out the measure. Imputation was not performed on the 
LBTs despite the high rate of missingness, because regression analyses (not reported) 
showed that the other variables only poorly predicted LBTs 1 and 2, and thus these 
variables were poor candidates for imputation. 
 DVs were examined to ensure that they met assumptions for linear (DVs 1-3) and 
logistic (DV4) regression (Gelman & Hill, 2006). Specifically, we visually checked for 
skew, kurtosis, and outliers through histograms and boxplots, and quantitatively by 
examining quantiles. DV3 (estimated risk), exhibited high leftward skew and a long right 
tail at both time points (pre- and post-). Thus, we log-transformed this variable prior to 
analysis, which reduced skew and eliminated outliers (defined here as ≥ 2 SDs from 
mean). To improve interpretability, the coefficients and summary statistics reported 
below for this measure are exponentiated so that they are returned to the original scale 
(zero to 1000: the sum of ten items from zero to 100).  
 We mean-centered all moderators by subtracting each raw score from the variable’s 
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mean and dividing the residual score by 2 SDs, to improve the interpretability of their 
coefficients (Gelman & Hill, 2006). Thus, all moderators had means of zero and SDs of 
.5.  
2.5.2. Statistical Analyses  
Manipulation Check: To confirm that participants were more engaged and 
subjectively more impacted by the self-affirmation and mindfulness interventions than 
the control intervention (designed to be inert), participants were asked to answer two 
questions at the conclusion of the study: How engaged were you during the audio 
recording? [Rate from 0 – 100, where:] (0 = not all engaged; 50 = moderately engaged; 
100 = completely engaged) How much did the audio recording affect your experience 
while reading the STI information? [Rate from 0 – 100, where:] (0 = not at all; 25 = a 
little bit; 50 = some; 75 = quite a bit; 100 = very significantly). Responses were analyzed 
using linear regressions separately comparing each pair of interventions (see next 
paragraph). 
 Hypotheses 1 – 3 concerned the primary aim: examination of the intervention 
effects. We conducted linear or logistic regressions that separately compared the effects 
of mindfulness to control (hypothesis 1), self-affirmation to control (hypothesis 2), and 
self-affirmation to mindfulness (hypothesis 3) for each DV.1 Each analysis was 
                                                        1 Researchers sometimes test the effect of active and control interventions using a single 
linear model that examines the effect of an intervention factor (with n levels for each n 
intervention conditions) on the dependent variable, and then run post-hoc analyses to 
compare interventions conditions to each other. However, such an approach is only 
appropriate when each level of the intervention factor is expected to have a different 
effect from all other levels. In contrast, in situations such as the present study, in which 
two or more levels of the intervention factor are expected to have identical and same 
direction effects (here, mindfulness and self-affirmation were hypothesized to perform 
about equally well with respect to control), a model testing a single factor is 
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conducted within data subsets containing only the observations corresponding to the 
intervention comparison of interest (e.g., only observations of individuals assigned to 
mindfulness and control for the mindfulness v. control comparison). For DVs 1 and 2 
(continuous variables collected post-manipulation), we regressed DV on intervention 
condition. For DV 4 (a dichotomous variable collected post-manipulation), we conducted 
a logistic regression in which DV4 was regressed on intervention.  
 For DV3 (a continuous variable collected pre- and post-manipulation), we built a 
multilevel model that included random effects of participants on all time terms. A first 
level model contained a fixed effect of slope (i.e., pre- and post-), a second level model 
also contained a fixed effect of group (e.g., mindfulness v. control) on intercept but not 
slope, and a third level model also contained fixed effects of group on slope. Model fit 
improvement was evaluated using -2 times change in log-likelihood, which is distributed 
as χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the parameters added. The key comparison, to 
evaluate whether intervention condition differently impacted change in estimated risk 
from pre- to post-intervention, was between the second and third level models, reflecting 
whether intervention condition had a significant time effect on the DV. Multilevel 
modeling was conducted using the ‘lme4’ package in R. 
Hypothesis 4 was that relative change in BAS activity, as assessed by the LBT, 
would be inversely associated with depth of health message processing. To test this 
hypothesis, we regressed each DV on percentage change in LBT. As in the first three 
                                                                                                                                                                     
inappropriate, because it would pool variance across the intervention levels. For this 
reason we tested each contrast of interest (mindfulness v. control, self-affirmation v. 
control, and mindfulness v. self-affirmation) separately.  
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hypotheses, simple linear regression was used for DVs 2 and 3, logistic regression was 
used for DV 4, and a multilevel model was used for DV1. 
Hypothesis 5 was that trait mindfulness would be positively associated with depth 
of health message processing, but this effect would not be evident in the self-affirmation 
or control conditions. To test this hypothesis, we regressed each DV on FFMQ scores 
using the same modeling approaches as in hypotheses 1 – 4.  
Hypothesis 6 was that self-esteem would be positively associated with depth of 
health message processing, but this effect would not be evident in in the mindfulness or 
control conditions. To test this hypothesis, we regressed each DV on RSES scores using 
the same modeling approaches as in hypotheses 1 – 4.  
The exploratory hypothesis concerned whether individuals in both the 
mindfulness and self-affirmation conditions would show a smaller increase in BAS 
activity after the health message than controls. As noted, this hypothesis was only 
expected to hold if hypotheses 1 and 2 (mindfulness and self-affirmation are superior to 
control) and hypothesis 4 (greater depth of processing is associated with less increase in 
BAS) were confirmed. Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 were not confirmed (see below) and thus 
the exploratory hypothesis was not tested. 
2.5.3. Power analysis.  A power analysis conducted in G*Power 3 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) indicated that 34 participants per condition (102 total) 
were needed to achieve a power of .81 for an estimated effect size of f2 = 0.25 at α = .05 
using linear regression with one predictor. The final sample (i.e., not including the 
individuals who were dropped from analyses because they were not sexually active) 
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consisted of 33 participants in the control, 37 in the self-affirmation, and 33 in the 
mindfulness condition.  
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Chapter 3: Results 
3.1. Manipulation Check 
 As expected, participants in the mindfulness condition reported being more 
engaged by the intervention (M = 73.52, SD = 17.91) than participants in the control 
condition (M = 48.42, SD = 28.33) (β = 12.55, p < .01, 95% CI [6.72, 18.37], adjusted R2 
= .21) and that the intervention affected the way that they subsequently viewed the health 
message (M = 43.33, SD = 33.57) to a greater extent than participants in the control 
condition (M = 28.48, SD = 27.38) (β = 7.42, p = .04, 95% CI [.27, 14.58], adjusted R2 = 
.05). Also as expected, participants in the self-affirmation condition reported no 
statistically significant differences in engagement (M = 76.95, SD = 19.17) and in how 
affected they were by the message (M = 33.57, SD = 29.95) compared to participants in 
the mindfulness condition (engagement p = .44; affected p = .18). Finally, although 
participants in the self-affirmation condition reported being more engaged in the message 
than participants in the control condition (β = 14.26, p < .01, 95% CI [8.54, 20], adjusted 
R2 = .26), participants in the self-affirmation conditions reported no detectable 
differences in being affected by the message compared to controls (β = 2.54, p = .46, 
95% CI [-4.33, 9.41], adjusted R2 = -.01). In sum, the manipulation produced expected 
different impacts on participants’ ratings of engagement and subjective impact, with the 
exception of no detectable difference in how self-affirmation relative control participants 
were affected by the message. 
3.2. Primary Aim Analyses (Intervention Main Effects) 
 Hypothesis 1: Did participants in the mindfulness condition show deeper 
processing of health information than those in the control condition? Surprisingly, the 
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below results show that there were no statistically significant differences between the 
mindfulness and control conditions in the four DVs.  The condition variable was 
treatment coded prior to analyses (Mirman, 2014), with control coded as 1 and 
mindfulness as -1. Thus, positive coefficients reported below reflect higher DV scores in 
the control condition (whereas negative reflect higher scores in the mindfulness 
condition). 
DV1: Contrary to hypothesis 1, participants in the mindfulness condition did not 
show statistically significant differences in their intent to change their behavior (M = 
52.60, SD = 20.84) compared to those in the control condition (M = 49.33, SD = 26.73) 
(β = -1.49, p = .53, 95% CI [-.7.75, 4.05], adjusted R2 = -.009). 
DV2: Contrary to hypothesis 1, participants in the control condition answered 
more quiz items correctly (M = 3.56 [of 6 items], SD = 1.39) than participants in the 
mindfulness (M = 3.21, SD = 1.27) condition. However, these differences were not 
statistically significant and accounted for less than 1% of variance (β = .18, p = .27, 95% 
CI [-.15, .51], adjusted R2 = 0.004).  
DV3: The effect of intervention condition on the intercept marginally improved 
model fit (χ2(1) = 3.26, p = .07), reflecting a large difference in estimated risk between 
groups prior to the intervention (mindfulness M = 54, SD = 78.87, control M = 91.81, SD 
= 96.94). However, contrary to hypothesis 1, there was no detectable improvement in 
model fit by adding the effect of intervention condition on slope (χ2(1) = 1.15, p = .28). 
Specifically, participants in both groups estimated higher risk (mindfulness M = 129.78, 
SD = 167.77, control M = 127.64, SD = 123.87) after the health message and 
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intervention; any difference in relative increase between groups may have been masked 
by the large differences between groups at baseline. 
DV4: Eleven of the 32 participants in the mindfulness condition took a pamphlet 
at the end of the experiment, compared to 9 of 31 participants in the control condition. 
These differences were not statistically significant (β = -.12, p = .65, 95% CI [-0.67, 
.40]).  
Hypothesis 2: Did participants in the self-affirmation condition show deeper 
processing of health information than those in the control condition? Surprisingly, the 
below results show that there were no statistically significant differences between the 
self-affirmation and control participants on DVs 1, 3, and 4.  On DV 2, the control 
condition actually answered more quiz items correctly than the self-affirmation group. 
However, this effect was just statistically significant at an uncorrected alpha of .05 and 
would not reach significance with alpha corrected for multiple comparisons using any 
standard correction method. Again, the condition variable was treatment coded prior to 
analyses, with mindfulness coded as 1 and self-affirmation as -1. Thus, positive 
coefficients reported below reflect higher DV scores in the control condition (whereas 
negative reflect higher in the self-affirmation condition). 
DV1: Contrary to hypothesis 2, participants in the self-affirmation condition did 
not show statistically significant differences in their intent to change behavior (M = 
53.03, SD = 22.73) compared to those in the control condition (M = 49.33, SD = 26.73) 
(β = -1.63, p = .58, 95% CI [-.7.53, 4.26], adjusted R2 = -.011). 
DV2: Contrary to hypothesis 2, participants in the control condition answered 
more quiz items correctly (M = 3.56 [of 6 items], SD = 1.39) than participants in the self-
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affirmation (M = 2.98, SD = 1.09) condition. These differences were statistically 
significant at an uncorrected α = .05  (β = .30, p = .05, 95% CI [.004, .60], adjusted R2 = 
0.04). However, it is important to note that 12 comparisons were performed comparing 
intervention conditions to each other. We present these results as is rather than arbitrarily 
picking a multiple comparisons method to judge statistical significance (see Gelman, 
Hill, & Yajima, 2009 for discussion), but readers should understand that in this setting 
the probability one of the effects appearing statistically significant by chance is around 
54% (1-[.9512] ≈ 46%). Thus, this opposite direction effect on DV2 may simply be due to 
noise. 
DV3: The effect of intervention condition on the intercept improved model fit 
(χ2(1) = 112.54, p < .01), reflecting a large difference in estimated risk between groups 
prior to the intervention (self-affirmation M = 50.59, SD = 50.73, control M = 91.82, SD 
= 96.93). Contrary to hypothesis 2, there was no detectable improvement in model fit by 
adding the effect of intervention condition on slope (χ2(1) = .002, p = .97). These results 
reflect the fact that participants in both groups estimated higher risk (self-affirmation M = 
76.81, SD = 82.77, control M = 127.63, SD = 123.87) after the health message and 
intervention, and the difference in relative increase is dwarfed by the large differences 
between groups at baseline. 
DV4: Eleven of the 37 participants in the self-affirmation condition took a 
pamphlet at the end of the experiment, compared to 9 of 31 participants in the control 
condition. This difference was not statistically significant (β = -.01, p = .95, 95% CI [-
0.55, .51]).    
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Hypothesis 3: Were there clinically meaningful differences in depth of processing 
between participants in the mindfulness and self-affirmation conditions? As predicted, 
the differences between these groups were quite small and none reached statistical 
significance. Again, the condition variable was treatment coded prior to analyses, with 
control coded as 1 and self-affirmation as -1. Thus, positive coefficients reported below 
reflect higher DV scores in the mindfulness condition (whereas negative reflect higher in 
the self-affirmation condition).  
DV1: Consistent with hypothesis 3, participants in the mindfulness condition did 
not show meaningful differences in their intent to change their behavior (M = 52.60, SD = 
20.84) compared to those in the self-affirmation condition (M = 53.03, SD = 22.73) (β = -
.22, p = .94, 95% CI [-.5.44, 5.01], adjusted R2 = -.01).  
DV2: There were also no statistically significant differences in number of correct 
quiz items between participants in the self-affirmation and control conditions (β = .12, p 
= .4, 95% CI [-.16, .40]), adjusted R2 = -0.004), reflecting a small difference in mean 
items correct between groups (participants in the mindfulness group answered on average 
.23 [out of 6] more quiz items correctly than those in self-affirmation) that was dwarfed 
by within-group variation (SD = 1.27 in mindfulness and SD = 1.09 in self-affirmation). 
DV3: The effect of intervention condition on the intercept did not improve model 
fit (χ2(1) = .11, p = .73), reflecting only a small difference in estimated risk between 
groups prior to the intervention (self-affirmation M = 50.59, SD = 50.73, mindfulness M 
= 54, SD = 78.87). Consistent with hypothesis 3, there was no detectable improvement in 
model fit by adding the effect of intervention condition on slope (χ2(1) = 1.25, p = .26), 
reflecting risk estimation increases (self-affirmation M = 76.81, SD = 82.77, mindfulness 
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M = 129.78, SD = 167.77) after the message in both groups with very large variability 
among participants. 
DV4: Eleven of the 32 participants in the mindfulness condition took a pamphlet 
at the end of the experiment, compared to 11 of 37 participants in the self-affirmation 
condition. These differences were not statistically significant (β = -.11, p = .68, 95% CI [-
0.40, .61]).    
Figures I-III in Appendix A plot the DVs by intervention condition. 
3.3. Secondary Aim Analyses (Moderators) 
Hypothesis 4: Did individuals who showed greater BAS activity after the health 
message (as assessed by change in LBT scores from pre- to post-intervention) process 
health information more superficially?  
As a reminder, the raw LBT scores at each time point are the sum of deviations 
from the true midpoint over the 14 lines. These values could be positive or negative. 
Positive scores are thought to reflect higher relative left frontal activity and thus higher 
BAS activity, whereas negative scores are thought to reflect higher relative right frontal 
activity and thus lower BAS activity. The analysis of interest was change in relative BAS 
activity from pre- to post-health message. Theory suggests that positive change in pre- to 
post-message BAS activity should scale with defensiveness toward the health message. 
For example, an individual whose pre-intervention LBT score was +3 but who jumps to 
+50 post-intervention should be more defensive toward the health message than someone 
who begins at +3 and does not change. Similarly, an individual who shows a decrease in 
BAS (e.g., from +3 to -50) in the wake of the message should be less defensive.  
We calculated percentage change in the LBT from pre- to post-intervention: 
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% Δ LBT = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝|𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝| , 
and regressed this change variable (M = -.18, SD = 2.91) on each DV. (Note that 
no LBT pre- scores were in the range -1 < score < 1; such scores would have required 
rounding to ±1 to avoid inflating the numerator.) Positive coefficients below represent 
positive change over the percent variable. 
 Of note, the percentage change LBT variable contained 15 outliers, a few of 
which were several SDs above the mean. Arguably, these data points are quite important, 
given the theory that a large magnitude jump in the activity of the BAS reflects a large 
increase in defensiveness toward health information, and given the large proportion of the 
sample (15/103) with outlying scores. Thus, the importance of including these outliers 
may outweigh the risk of skewing results from the central tendency. The below results 
show, contrary to hypothesis 4, that there was no significant relationship between LBT 
change and change in the DVs. The below analyses include the LBT without outliers 
changed. However, we also ran analyses with outliers changed to 2 SDs above or below 
the mean; these results were not qualitatively different (all ps > .07) and thus are not 
reported. 
DV1: Contrary to hypothesis 4, there was no statistically significant relationship 
between LBT scores and intent-to-change behavior (β = -.02, p = .61, 95% CI [-0.13, 
.07], adjusted R2 = -.01).  
DV2: Contrary to hypothesis 4, there was also no statistically significant 
difference in percent change in LBT as a function of quiz scores (β < .01, p = .74, 95% CI 
[-.006, .004]), adjusted R2 = -0.01). 
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DV3: We attempted to construct a multilevel model for DV3, but the model failed 
to converge. Thus I calculated a percentage change variable for DV3:  
% Δ estimated risk = (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝−𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)|𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝|  + 1 
(the shift by +1 is used to avoid zeroes in the denominator), and regressed the percentage 
change in LBT variable on this percentage change in risk variable. The calculation of a 
percentage change variable is itself a normalization procedure, and thus we used raw 
rather than log-transformed risk estimate values in this calculation. However, the percent 
estimate risk variable retained significant outliers. We changed these to within ±2 SDs 
prior to analysis. 
Contrary to hypothesis 4, there was no statistically significant difference in 
percent change in LBT as a function of percent change in estimated risk (β < .01, p = .88, 
95% CI [>-.01, .01]), adjusted R2 = -0.01). 
DV4: Contrary to hypothesis 4, there was no statistically significant difference in 
percent change in LBT as a function of probability of taking a pamphlet (β = < .01, p = 
.91, 95% CI [-0.002, .001]).    
Hypothesis 5: Was trait mindfulness positively associated with depth of health 
message processing in the mindfulness condition (but not in the other conditions)? To test 
this hypothesis, we examined the effect of trait mindfulness in subsets of the data 
containing just one condition. 
DV1: Contrary to hypothesis 5, participants in the mindfulness condition who 
were higher in trait mindfulness were less intent to change their behavior (β = -25.93, p < 
.01, 95% CI [-.25.93, 5.85], adjusted R2 = -.01) than those low in trait mindfulness. As 
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predicted, there were no differences in the control (p = .63) or self-affirmation (p = .44) 
groups. 
DV2: Contrary to hypothesis 5, there was no statistically significant relationship 
between number of correct quiz items and trait mindfulness score in the mindfulness 
condition (β = -.05, p = .91, 95% CI [-.98, .87]), adjusted R2 = -0.03). As predicted, there 
were also no differences in the control (p = .83) or self-affirmation (p = .14) groups. 
DV3: The effect of trait mindfulness on the intercept did not improve model fit 
(χ2(1) = .017, p = .90) in the mindfulness group, reflecting no detectable difference in 
rating of baseline risk as a function of trait mindfulness among participants in this 
condition. Contrary to hypothesis 5, there was no detectable improvement in model fit by 
adding the effect of trait mindfulness on slope (χ2(1) = .65, p = .42): That is, participants 
in the mindfulness group did not estimate they were at higher risk following the 
intervention and message if they were high compared to low in trait mindfulness. Trait 
mindfulness also did not contribute to higher risk ratings at baseline among self-
affirmation (p = .65) or control (p = .19) participants. As predicted, participants in the 
self-affirmation (p = .65) and control (p = .32) groups also did not show a greater 
increase in risk estimation if they were higher than lower in trait mindfulness. 
DV4: Contrary to hypothesis 5, there was no detectable difference in the 
probability of taking a pamphlet among individuals with high compared to low trait 
mindfulness in the mindfulness group (β = -1.09, p = .19, 95% CI [-0.55, .51]). As 
predicted, there were also no detectable differences as a function of trait mindfulness in 
the self-affirmation group (p = .79). Surprisingly, participants in the control condition 
were more likely to pick up a pamphlet if they were higher in trait mindfulness, but this 
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effect was only just statistically significant and would not survive correction for multiple 
comparisons (β = 1.9, p = .04, 95% CI [0.20, 3.98]). 
Hypothesis 6: Was trait self-esteem positively associated with depth of health 
message processing in the self-affirmation condition (but not in the other conditions)? To 
test this hypothesis, we examined the effect of trait self-esteem in subsets of the data 
containing just one condition. 
DV1: Contrary to hypothesis 6, participants in the self-affirmation condition who 
were higher in trait self-esteem showed no detectable difference in intent-to-change their 
behavior (β = .46, p = .58, 95% CI [-1.22, 2.13], adjusted R2 = -.02) compared to those 
low in trait self-esteem. As predicted, there were also no differences in intent as a 
function of self-esteem in the control (p = .25) or mindfulness (p = .98) groups. 
DV2: Contrary to hypothesis 6, there was no statistically significant relationship 
between number of correct quiz items and self-esteem rating in the self-affirmation 
condition (β = -.02, p = .62, 95% CI [-.11, .61]), adjusted R2 = -0.02). As predicted, there 
were also no differences in the control (p = .08) or mindfulness (p = .95) groups. 
DV3: The effect of self-esteem on the intercept did not improve model fit (χ2(1) = 
.44, p = .51) in the self-affirmation group, reflecting no detectable difference in baseline 
risk rating as a function of trait self-esteem among participants in this condition. Contrary 
to hypothesis 6, there was no detectable improvement in model fit by adding the effect of 
trait mindfulness on slope (χ2(1) = .08, p = .78). That is, participants in the self-
affirmation group did not estimate they were at higher risk following the intervention if 
they were higher in trait self-esteem. Trait mindfulness also did not contribute to higher 
risk ratings at baseline among mindfulness (p = .62) and control (p = .11) participants. As 
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predicted, participants in the mindfulness (p = .45) and control (p = .84) conditions also 
did not increase their risk estimation if they were higher than lower in self-esteem. 
DV4: Contrary to hypothesis 6, in the self-affirmation group there was no 
detectable difference in the probability of taking a pamphlet among individuals with high 
compared to low self-esteem (β = -0.102, p = .26, 95% CI [-0.3, 0.06]). As predicted, 
there were also no detectable differences in the mindfulness group (p = .64) or control (p 
= .64) conditions. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
 Health messages are a major tool used by governments and health agencies to 
fight preventable disease and mortality. Yet research suggests that health messages are 
often least effective for those at highest risk, possibly because individuals at high risk 
erect conscious or unconscious barriers against personally-relevant health messages (Riet 
& Ruiter, 2013). Over a dozen studies have examined whether self-affirmation 
interventions—interventions designed to bolster self-integrity—enhance processing of 
health messages among at-risk individuals (Epton et al., 2015; Sweeney & Moyer, 2015). 
Building on this prior research, this study compared self-affirmation to an intervention 
that had never before been tested in a health message context: mindfulness meditation. 
The primary aim was to compare the effects of mindfulness to the more established self-
affirmation intervention. A secondary aim was to examine whether three possible 
moderators of the interventions—trait mindfulness, self-esteem, and activity in the 
BAS—did in fact co-vary with the interventions. Contrary to hypotheses, neither the self-
affirmation nor mindfulness intervention enhanced health message processing relative to 
a control condition. Moreover, none of the potential moderators actually co-varied with 
the interventions. We discuss these null findings in turn in the next two sections. 
4.1 Primary Aim Findings 
Contrary to hypotheses, participants in the mindfulness condition showed no 
detectable differences from the control condition in any of the four DVs measuring depth 
of message processing. The null findings in the mindfulness condition are not particularly 
noteworthy because they do not conflict with an existing literature. We focus on the null 
findings in the self-affirmation condition.   
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The specific findings in the self-affirmation condition were that participants 
showed no differences from the control condition in three of the four DVs. On the other 
DV—the number of items remembered from a quiz about the health message—the 
control group actually answered more items correctly than the self-affirmation group 
(although this effect was small, explaining only ~ 4% of variance in quiz responses).  
These null findings are particularly noteworthy in light of two recent meta-
analyses of self-affirmation interventions in a health message context (Epton et al., 2015; 
Sweeney & Moyer, 2015). Both analyses were motivated by the fact that numerous self-
affirmation and health message studies have been conducted over the last several years. 
The authors of both meta-analyses highlighted the consequent need to aggregate the 
effects from these more recent studies with those of earlier studies (e.g., Crocker et al., 
2008; Harris & Napper, 2005; Harris et al., 2007; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Sherman et 
al., 2000). Until these recent meta-analyses, the most significant review of self-
affirmation and health messages was a narrative review and companion piece by Harris 
and Epton, which had reviewed 21 studies (Harris & Epton, 2009; Harris & Epton, 2010). 
Harris and Epton (2009) found that self-affirmed participants were consistently more 
accepting of health messages and also more likely to exhibit positive target behavior in 
the short-term (e.g., taking a pamphlet containing further information or taking a sample 
of sunscreen) than participants in control conditions. However, they also found self-
affirmed participants were only inconsistently more intent-to-change their behavior, and 
also only inconsistently changed target behavior in the long-term (e.g., reducing caffeine 
or alcohol consumption when asked about their consumption a week to a month later). 
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They concluded self-affirmation showed promise as an intervention to enhance message 
processing, but further research was needed.  
Of note, Harris and Epton’s (2009) narrative review did not quantitatively 
aggregate self-affirmation effects; nor did it include theses or other findings unpublished 
in peer-review journals. Epton and colleagues’ (2015) more recent review redressed these 
issues through meta-analysis and by collecting unpublished findings through a call to 
LISTSERVs and personal contacts, as well as by including the numerous studies 
conducted since the 2009 narrative review. Thus, this more recent analysis included 
results from 41 (compared to 21 in the 2009 review) studies. The meta-analysis found 
that self-affirmation produced positive, but quite small effects on message acceptance (d 
= .17, 95% CI [.03 to.31]), intent-to-change behavior (d = .14, 95 % CI [.05 to .23]), and 
target behavior (d = .32, 95% CI [.19 to .44]). Notably, when the authors excluded 
underpowered studies (which are likely to have vastly inflated effects; see Button et al., 
2013; Gelman & Carlin, 2014), effects in the acceptance intervention were no longer 
statistically different from zero (d+ = .15, 95% CI [-.04 to .34]) and the estimated intent-
to-change effect size shrunk to d+ = .11 (95% CI [.001 to .22]). It is noteworthy that the 
parameters the authors set to classify studies as underpowered or not (55% power to 
detect an effect of d = .50) were extremely liberal, considering that the standard power 
criterion used by researchers is 80%, and that the authors’ estimated meta-analytic effects 
of message acceptance and intent-to-change were d+ = .14 and .17, respectively (that is, 
lower than the effect size estimate in the power analysis by a factor of nearly 3). Yet even 
with this exceptionally liberal threshold, only 44.1% (15/34) of studies with message 
acceptance DVs and 37.5% (24/64) with intent-to-change DVs had sample sizes 
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sufficient to warrant inclusion in this subset analysis. Thus, it is probable that the large 
majority of self-affirmation and health messages studies that have used acceptance and 
intent-to-change DVs were vastly underpowered to detect effects. Button and colleagues 
(2013) and Gelman and Carlin (2014) offer enlightening discussions of how a 
preponderance of underpowered studies within a literature produce dramatically inflated 
effect size estimates when these results are synthesized. Therefore, even the small effect 
size point estimates reported in Epton and colleagues (2015) are likely highly inflated. 
Sweeney and Moyer (2015) also conducted a recent meta-analysis of self-
affirmation and health message studies. Their primary results are of less interest than 
those of Epton and colleagues (2015), because Sweeney and Moyer (2015) only analyzed 
16, rather than 41, studies, and because the two outcomes that they measured were also 
examined in the more comprehensive Epton and colleagues’ analysis.2 However, 
Sweeney and Moyer (2015) conducted two additional analyses that answer key questions 
left open by Epton and colleagues (2015). First, Sweeney and Moyer (2015) conducted a 
meta-regression to examine the effect of intent-to-change on behavior (within 10 studies 
that examined both outcomes). They found that intent-to-change did not predict actual 
behavior change (β = .03, 95% CI [-.30, .36]). This finding undermines a key assumption 
in the self-affirmation and health messages literature: that self-affirmation promotes 
intent-to-change which in turn promotes behavior change. Second, Sweeney and Moyer 
compared the effect sizes of self-affirmation on short- versus long-term behavior, and                                                         2 The effects Sweeney and Moyer found on outcome variables—intent to change 
behavior (d  = .26, 95% CI [.04, .48]) and behavior (d  = .27, 95% CI [.11, .43])—were 
comparable to those found in the meta-analysis by Epton et al. (2015). However, because 
Epton and colleagues (2015) examined more studies, and included unpublished studies, it 
is likely that their estimates more closely approach the true size of the effects for these 
outcomes. 
46 
found that the effect on long-term behavior (d = .33, 95% CI [.17, .50]) was actually 
larger than that on short-term behavior (d  = .17, 95% CI [-.20, .55]).  
Taken together, these meta-analytic results provide crucial information for 
researchers wishing to conduct self-affirmation and health message research in the future. 
In our view, the results mandate a reconceptualization of fundamental assumptions 
regarding how self-affirmation interventions operate. The present study—which began in 
July 2014, prior to the publication of these meta-analyses—embodies a set of 
assumptions that are profoundly challenged by the meta-analyses. Thus, this discussion 
provides an instructive opportunity to illustrate how the meta-analyses ought to shift 
researchers’ priors about the true size of self-affirmation effects in a health message 
context, as well as about how to design studies in this area in future research. 
The present study examined four DVs. Three—recall, intent to change, and 
change in estimated risk—were designed as intervening variables between the 
intervention and behavior change. These DVs attempted to measure different facets of 
message processing, under the assumption that enhanced processing would ultimately 
lead to behavior change. The fourth DV was a short-term behavior measure (did or did 
not take a pamphlet). This structure mirrors that of some of the classic self-affirmation 
and health message processing studies (e.g., Armitage et al., 2008; Crocker et al., 2008; 
Harris & Napper, 2005), each of which also collected two or more intervening DVs and 
at most one behavioral DV. As in the present study, the assumption underlying these 
designs is that enhanced processing, as reflected in intervening variables, should produce 
behavior change, given that behavior change (both measured and unmeasured) is the 
ultimate target of the interventions.  
47 
This approach is unusual. In many areas of psychology, variables that are 
conceptually conceived of as intervening, rather than criterion, variables are treated as 
moderators rather than DVs. Imagine a psychotherapy intervention study for depression 
that compares two therapies, one of which trains participants in mindfulness. The 
researchers may expect that individuals who become more mindful will become less 
depressed, and that individuals in the mindfulness therapy condition will become more 
mindful than those in the other intervention condition. The most common strategy to 
assess these hypotheses is to measure depression and other direct measures of poor 
mental health as DVs, and then to also examine whether mindfulness change does or does 
not co-vary with the intervention in the expected direction with respect to these criterion 
variables. Sometimes, a construct like mindfulness eventually becomes established as a 
consistent co-variate of improvement in a constellation of mental health criterion 
variables. At that point, researchers may come to see it as a target in its own right, and to 
treat it as a criterion variable. However, this transition from intervening to criterion 
variable tends to occur after a large body of evidence has accumulated showing that 
change in the variable, as a function of intervention, is associated with positive change in 
various criterion variables. However, in the case of self-affirmation and health messages, 
behavior change has typically only been measured by one or no measures, rather than by 
multiple metrics. This design has been used continually in the self-affirmation literature, 
despite the lack of evidence that the intervening variables are consistent correlates of 
behavior change, assessed via multiple measures, and therefore worthy target variables in 
their own right. In addition to collecting few behavioral measures, few studies have 
examined the effects of the intervening variables on behavior change. Those that have 
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(e.g., Harris & Napper, 2005) did not find a relationship between the intervening variable 
and behavior change.  
The current study followed this standard design (multiple intervening variables 
treated solely as DVs, and one or no behavior DVs), which in light of the meta-analyses 
appears flawed in two ways. First, Epton et al. (2015) showed that the effects of self-
affirmation on the two intervening DVs they examined—acceptance and intent to 
change—are tiny (.03 ≤ 95% CI of ds ≤ .31). Second, even putting aside effect sizes, the 
meta-regression analysis by Sweeney and Moyer (2015) raises a fundamental challenge 
to the intervening variable assumption, by showing that the intervening variable intent-to-
change was not associated with actual behavior change. Remarkably, Sweeney and 
Moyer’s (2015) analysis is to our knowledge the first cumulative test (in the self-
affirmation and health messages literature) of the fundamental assumption that enhancing 
processing vis-à-vis a DV such as intent-to-change actually promotes behavior change. 
To make the critiques in this section precise, and as an aid for researchers 
designing self-affirmation and health message studies in the future, we generated power 
analysis statistics. We asked: What sample size is required for an 80% chance of 
detecting an effect of self-affirmation compared to control on message acceptance and 
intent-to-change (conceptualized as DVs)? This analysis required an effect size estimate. 
As discussed, it is well-established that underpowered studies will artificially inflate 
effect sizes (Button et al., 2013; Gelman & Carlin, 2014). Thus, for our effect size 
estimate we use the estimate from the smaller subset of studies selected by Epton and 
colleagues (2015) as having adequate statistical power, as described above. However, 
even in this smaller subset of studies, these point effect size estimates are likely quite 
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large overestimations of the true effect size. First, as noted, the parameters set by Epton 
and colleagues to define adequate power were extremely liberal. Second, it is 
extraordinarily likely that at least some (if not all) of the researchers in the aggregated 
research studies exploited so-called “researcher degrees of freedom”; that is, they did not 
precisely specify sample size and all analysis parameters prior to conducting the study, 
and instead made these decisions conditioned on the data in front of them. Simmons, 
Nelson, and Simonsohn (2011) analyze how researcher degrees of freedom produces 
overestimated effect sizes in the published literature. Third, is it likely that Epton and 
colleagues (2015) were unable to collect some unpublished null findings (such as those in 
the current study). These latter issues are not specific to self-affirmation and health 
messages, but rather present in all meta-analytic syntheses of published literature. 
However, these issues are highly problematic in the present case because the effect size 
estimates are relatively close to zero. Because these two sources of bias are uncorrected 
for, the following power analyses probably underestimate the true sample size required to 
achieve 80% power (Gelman & Carlin, 2014). Yet even without correction and accepting 
Epton and colleagues’ (2015) estimates as true, the results may be surprising. 
We calculated power estimates using the ‘pwr’ package in R, for power in a two 
independent samples, two-sided t-test, assuming equal sample sizes. With α = .05, the 
required sample size for β = .80 for the acceptance effect (d+ estimate = .15) is N = 802 
(i.e., 401 participants per group), and the required sample size for β = .80 for the intent-
to-change effect (d+ estimate = .11) is N = 1298 (i.e., 649 participants per group). Clearly, 
these are unrealistically large sample sizes for nearly all researchers. 
In fact, the situation is even bleaker than these statistics suggest. Because few data 
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are available on the effect size of message acceptance and intent-to-change as moderators 
(i.e., with respect to behavior change), the above power analyses are conducted by 
conceptualizing these measures as DVs. But, as we have already argued, a more sensible 
approach is to treat these variables as moderators. However, given the very small amount 
of variance in these measures that can be attributed to self-affirmation, and the small 
amount of variation in behavior change (d+ estimate = .33 in the better-powered study 
subset examined by Epton and colleagues [2015]) associated with the self-affirmation 
intervention itself, the prospect of studies reliably detecting an interaction effect between 
intervention and intervening variable on behavior (or the within-condition intervening 
variable main effect) seems very slim, even if massive sample sizes are used.  
We hope this discussion leads to more critical evaluation of the strength and 
significance of effects in the self-affirmation and health messages literature. In our view, 
the challenges posed by the Epton and colleagues’ and Sweeney and Moyer’s (2015) 
meta-analyses have been insufficiently appreciated. For example, in a recent paper aimed 
at policy-makers, Ehret and Sherman (2014) highlight the promise of self-affirmation 
interventions for facilitating health behavior change. Summarizing the Epton and 
colleagues’ and Sweeney and Moyer’s meta-analyses, Ehret and Sherman state, “Two 
recent meta-analyses (quantitative summaries across studies) show self-affirmation’s 
impact on health message acceptance, intentions to change, and subsequent health 
behavior: small but reliable effects on all three outcomes” (Ehret and Sherman, 2014, p. 
224). In our view, this summary ignores the conclusion that should follow from the meta-
analyses: There is a high probability that effects as small as those found in the intent-to-
change and acceptance measures are driven by publication and researcher bias, and 
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perhaps by a tiny positive true effect that it is not clinically significant. We are not 
suggesting that Ehret and Sherman (2014) are intentionally being misleading, but rather 
that they are being overly optimistic. Indeed, we offer our own study as a prime example 
of how a qualitative perusal of the literature—of the kind we conducted prior to this 
study—can lead to excessive optimism about the true size of effects. This excessive 
optimism is evident in our pre-study power analysis (p. 28, this document), in which we 
concluded we needed 34 participants per condition, for an 80% chance of detecting an 
effect size of f2 = .25 at an uncorrected α = .05 (equivalent to Cohen’s d = 1). In light of 
the meta-analyses, this estimated effect size seems wildly optimistic. However, even 
before these meta-analyses were conducted, we could have taken steps to produce more 
realistic estimates ourselves. For example, it would have been quite feasible to aggregate 
the effects of around 10 large self-affirmation studies with DVs similar to ours, using any 
of the easy to use meta-analytic tools available in R (which can produce the weighted 
least squares estimates necessary to aggregate effects). We could have then estimated the 
extent to which our point estimates of effect size from that analysis were inflated, for 
example using the retrodesign() function (implemented in R) recently written by Gelman 
and Carlin (2014).  
4.1.2. Moving Forward.  
 
We are now in a position to make a few recommendations for moving the self-
affirmation and health messages literature forward. First, it would be helpful to have 
meta-analytic effect size estimates of other intervening variables that have been 
commonly administered in the literature, such as estimated risk and recall. Of note, there 
was a complete absence of effects on these variables within our study; also, Harris and 
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Epton’s (2009) review does not suggest these measures are particularly promising. 
However, formal meta-analytic aggregation of these effects would help researchers draw 
clear conclusions about the potential of these measures as moderators.  
Another step forward would be to develop new moderators (and actually test them 
from the start as moderators rather than as conceptual intervening variables measured as 
DVs). Perhaps the ideal moderator could be administered repeatedly within-subject, 
would not be subject to self-report bias (particularly problematic with multiple 
administrations), and would exhibit strong predictive power with respect to long-term 
behavior change—with behavior change also measured multimodally and at several time 
points. An important recent step toward developing such a moderator has been made by 
Emily Falk and colleagues, who showed that functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI) signals hold promise as intervening variables that can predict behavior change 
(Cascio et al., 2015; Falk, Berkman, Mann, Harrison, & Lieberman, 2010; Falk, Morelli, 
Welborn, Dambacher, & Lieberman, 2013; Falk et al., 2015a; Falk et al., 2015b). Two of 
these studies examined the neural correlates of health message processing among 
individuals who received self-affirmation interventions (Cascio et al., 2015; Falk et al., 
2015a). In both analyses, self-affirmed individuals who showed higher activity in 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) subsequently engaged in more long-term 
behavior change following the intervention.  
These findings are of interest because of the anatomical—functional role of 
vmPFC. Human cortex is topographically organized. Dorsal and lateral areas mediating 
higher order aspects of cognition, such as self-referential thinking and complex planning, 
overlay more ventral and medial regions. Ventral and medial regions receive dense 
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projections from subcortical areas that store features of emotional memories and which 
are first-line responders to emotional information. Hence, vmPFC is sandwiched between 
areas mediating emotional reaction and bottom-up emotion associations, and areas 
involved in higher-order cognition (Arnsten, 2015). Consistent with its anatomy, 
neuroimaging studies have shown that vmPFC is a site of emotional integration, helping 
to cumulate and organize emotional experience (Smith et al., 2010; Winecoff et al., 
2013). Notably, signal strength in the vmPFC appears to scale with the emotional 
significance of experiences (Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 2012). Thus, Falk and colleagues’ 
findings that higher vmPFC signal is associated with subsequent behavior change 
suggests that the strength of vmPFC signal may reflect emotional engagement with and 
emotional resonance in response to the health message. 
Thus, activity in vmPFC appears to hold promise as an intervening variable. In 
practice, however, there are significant barriers involved in using fMRI data as a 
predictor of intervention response. First, fMRI is extremely costly (typically around $500 
per scan session for a single participant) and thus impractical in many research settings 
(and virtually all clinical settings). Second, the fMRI BOLD signal has a complicated, 
nonlinear relationship with neural activity in any given brain region (Logothetis, 2008). 
Thus, it is unclear how precisely fMRI activity in any region or set of regions can scale 
with a psychological unobservable (e.g., emotional resonance), particularly within a 
single individual (as compared to averaged vmPFC signal among groups, e.g., those 
receiving an intervention versus not). This limitation weakens the prospect of using fMRI 
to predict health behavior change among individuals.  
Thus, vmPFC activity (and potentially other fMRI signals) is perhaps a most 
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promising moderator for researchers with access to fMRI who are working to optimize 
self-affirmation and other persuasion interventions (e.g., see Falk et al., 2015b). 
However, other intervening variables may have more practical use in clinical settings as 
predictors of individual behavior change. The present study therefore provided a timely 
test of the LBT, a possible intervening variable that could easily be exported to clinical 
settings (as discussed in the introduction), as well as of two other potential moderators—
trait mindfulness and self-esteem. 
4.2 Secondary Aim Findings 
 Contrary to hypotheses, LBT change scores from pre- to post-intervention showed 
no association with the DVs. These results conflict with two previous studies showing 
that line bisection scores were increased by threatening experimental manipulations 
(McGregor et al., 2010a; Nash et al., 2010), but accord with more recent null findings for 
the LBT in a similar paradigm (Leggett et al., 2015). Of note, the null findings in the 
current study held across all four DVs. Moreover, the current study was the first to 
administer the LBT at pre- and post–health message. As discussed in the introduction, 
administration at pre- and post- should parcel out noisy individual variation in the task. 
Thus, in combination with the findings of Leggett et al. (2015), the findings in the current 
study push the balance of evidence away from the LBT as a promising moderator. 
However, further research is still needed, given that only a few prior studies have used 
the LBT. The current study also found mindfulness and self-esteem did not co-vary with 
the interventions as hypothesized. However, these latter null findings are less noteworthy 
in light of the absence of intervention effects.   
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4.3 Limitations and Conclusion 
 One notable limitation of this study, which somewhat qualifies the null findings, 
is that participants in the control condition may have come from a different population 
than those in the mindfulness and self-affirmation conditions. The evidence for this is 
that, despite random assignment, control participants estimated they were at higher risk 
(DV3) at baseline (i.e., before seeing the health message) than participants in the 
mindfulness or self-affirmation conditions. This limitation is also instructive for 
researchers designing self-affirmation and health message studies. These group 
differences conflict with our expectation when designing the study that unsystematic 
differences between groups would be trivial due to randomization. The magnitude of 
differences in risk estimation here suggests that investigators studying self-affirmation 
and health messages should carefully examine baseline differences (they have only done 
so inconsistently to date). If differences are consistently found even in randomized 
designs with relatively large sample sizes, such as the current study, researchers may 
need to match participants to conditions as a function of baseline risk. Another limitation 
of this study was that we only examined short- rather than long-term behavior change.  
 A final limitation concerns the population studied. As discussed, we believe 
researchers should focus on designing interventions that impact behavior change, given 
the evidence suggesting behavioral targets are more realistic and straightforward targets 
than attitudinal shifts assumed to co-vary with behavior change. In light of this 
assessment, we would have been wise to include measures in the current study of long-
term behavior change with regards to sexual health. However, we must admit we do not 
have a clear sense of the extent to which participants in this sample were engaging in 
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unhealthy sexual practices. That is, we are unclear on whether participants were engaging 
in behavior worth changing. In particular, we did not include a rich assessment of current 
sexual health practices; instead, we simply asked participants whether they were sexually 
active or not. Hence some of the participants in our sample could have been, for example, 
engaged in monogamous long-term relationships in which there was little risk of 
contracting an STI. This limitation is also instructive for researchers designing self-
affirmation and health message studies in the future. The current corpus of studies 
consists of some studies providing health messages on behaviors that are unequivocally 
unhealthy (e.g., smoking) and others for which the evidence is much murkier (e.g., 
caffeine consumption). As researchers shift toward tracking behavior change, they would 
be wise to ensure that the behavior change targeted is actually worth changing, and to 
closely assess the extent to which participants in the sample perform behaviors that they 
would benefit from changing. 
Summarizing, the most fruitful steps going forward appear to be (1) optimize the 
effect of self-affirmation interventions on long-term behavior; (2) use a more diverse set 
of intervening variables (including biological signals and neuropsychological measures) 
than in prior research; and (3) treat intervening variables as moderators of long-term 
behavior change, instead of simply using these variables as DVs that are assumed to co-
vary with behavior change. The urgency of these steps is underscored by the recent paper, 
discussed above, promoting self-affirmation to policy-makers (Ehret & Sherman, 2014). 
In contrast to the optimism displayed by Ehret and Sherman (2014), the null findings in 
the current study, together with the two recent meta-analyses reviewed in this discussion, 
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suggest to us that much more basic research is needed before self-affirmation for health 
messages is exported to real-world settings.   
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
 
Table I: List of Measures and Time Points 
   Pre-Intervention and Message  Post-Intervention and Message 
 
Demographic &  
History of Illness 
 
 
Manip. Check 
 
 
Moderator 1: LBT 
 
 
Moderator 2:  
FFMQ 
 
 
Moderator 3:  
RSES 
 
DV1: Intent-to-
change 
 
DV2: Quiz Items 
Correct 
 
DV3:  
Risk Estimate 
 
 
DV4: Took 
Pamphlet? 
  
                    X  
 X 
X X 
X  
X  
 X 
 X 
X X 
 X 
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Figure I: Point Plots of Means with Error Bars of DV1 (Intent-to-change) and DV2 
(Number of Quiz Items Correct) 
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Figure II: DV3 (Estimated Risk)  
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Figure III: DV4 (Took Pamphlet?) 
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Appendix B: Intervention Scripts    
Mindfulness Intervention: 
Note: This script was adapted from The Mountain exercise in the book ACT Made 
Simple, by Russ Harris (Harris, 2009) 
 
 What I’d like to do right now is lead you through a mindfulness meditation 
exercise. Don’t worry if you’ve never done anything like this before; I’ll be giving you 
instructions the whole way through. Some of the language that gets used in these kinds of 
exercises can be feel a bit contrived at times; I’ve certainly felt that way when learning to 
meditate. However, I also think that the basic practice can be quite powerful. We spend 
so much of our day rushing from place to place that it can be quite a change to notice 
what’s going on in our experience, including judgments we’re having about the exercise. 
So I’ll ask that – as long you’re here anyway – you give this your best shot for the next 
15 minutes or so. 
One other thing worth noting before we begin is that the goal of this exercise is not 
to relax, or to get into any kind of special state. Instead the goal is to listen and follow the 
instructions, in an attentive, but very ordinary, kind of way. 
The first thing that we can do, to remind ourselves to be in the present is to sit a bit 
differently.  
So I’ll ask that you sit at the edge of your seat in an upright posture, so that your back is 
away from the edge of the chair, and your feet are resting comfortably and fully on the 
ground. Please do that right now.  
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 And I’ll also ask that you change how your back is positioned a bit. Now that your 
lower back is away from the chair, straighten it, so that it’s very strong. You want to 
imagine it as a very strong, very straight column—almost like it’s a very straight and 
strong tree growing out of the soil of the chair. Do you have that sense of a strong lower 
back?  
 You can let your legs relax a bit, and let your palms lay face down just above your 
knees, so that you’re sitting at attention, but in a relaxed kind of way, while still 
maintaining that sense of strong posture, of strong lower spine [pause 3 seconds]. Now, 
because your lower spine is so strong, you can let your upper body relax a bit—supported 
by that very strong base. You don’t want to slump your shoulders, but see if you can 
exhale and let some of the tension in your shoulders relax a bit. Your upper body muscles 
can feel almost like clothes hanging off a clothes hanger. There’s not a lot of muscle 
tension that’s needed because of the support that’s coming from your spine, just like the 
clothes don’t need any tension because they’re supported by the hanger. [pause 4 
seconds] 
 Take a moment to feel that posture, in the room, right now [pause 7 seconds].  
 There’s a sense in which sitting like this, just by itself, in this very ordinary but 
attentive kind of way, is very dignifying. [pause 5 seconds] There’s a saying that we sit 
like a benevolent queen or a benevolent king on her or his throne. As if the room is your 
court, that you’re attending to. [pause 10 seconds] 
 Now please gently close your eyes. And bring your attention to your body for a 
moment. See where you feel aches and tensions, see where you feel nothing. Whatever 
you feel, don’t adjust to solve the ache and pain, or try to breathe into it to make it go 
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away. Just see if you can notice the sensation—or the non-sensation—and let it be there 
while maintaining your strong sense of posture. [pause 10s] 
 You’ll notice that your mind is apt to wander, after 2 seconds, 3 seconds, 1 second 
maybe. That’s expected, and will happen again and again throughout this exercise. That’s 
one of the points of this exercise, is to practice coming back after your mind wanders. 
And you can’t practice coming back unless your mind wanders in the first place. So 
notice your mind wandering when you notice it, and take that opportunity to come back 
to the sense of your body. If doesn’t matter if you were away for 2 seconds or 5 minutes; 
all that matters is coming back to your sense of yourself, in the room, now. [pause 3s] Try 
that for a bit. 
[pause 15s] 
Now, keeping your eyes closed, I would like for us to try a visualization. Just as 
with your sense of being in the room, being in your body, and feeling your posture, 
you’re going to lose track of this visualization many different times. That’s expected—so 
whenever you notice that you’re off somewhere else, just set an intention to come back 
now. And then simply come back—without needing to worry about whether you’re doing 
the exercise right, or how long you were away for. [pause 3 seconds]. 
 So now please picture a mountain, as if you’re facing it from some kind of vantage 
point, so that the mountain is across from you and you’re seeing it. [pause 6s]. See if you 
can see the details of the mountain. You don’t need to describe it with words, rather just 
see it in as much detail as you can. [pause 6s] 
 Pay particular attention to the solidity of the mountain. [pause 5 seconds]. There’s a 
certain kind of “there-ness” – “in-the-Earthness” -- about it. See if you can get almost a 
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bodily sense of that mountain, which has been there longer than anyone can remember, 
and will keep being there longer than anyone lives. [pause 8 seconds]. The mountain 
doesn’t need to do anything to keep being there. It doesn’t need to try, to make an effort, 
to really, really be a mountain. It’s just there, period, right now [pause 4s]. 
 Now imagine different weather around the mountain. Dark clouds and rain 
surrounding, even engulfing the mountain. And the mountain stays, not doing anything in 
particular, just letting the weather surround it. And the clouds pass and it’s still there. See 
hot sun, rising in front of the mountain, hitting it with rays as it climbs, until it’s directly 
over the mountain. Then the sun makes its way behind the mountain. And finally, after 
the sun sets, there’s darkness. It might be hard to see the mountain at this point, but it’s 
there whether visible or not. During winter, there’s snow hitting the mountain. Hail 
pelting it. Ice freezing on its peaks. And all the while the mountain is just there, as a 
mountain, no more and no less.  
[pause 15s] 
 Now, if your mind has drifted off to somewhere else, gently come back. Bring back 
that image of the mountain, just there—unchanging—while the weather comes and 
passes all around it. And see if you can get a sense of your body, in this very strong, 
mountain-like posture, holding all of your experiences. In other words, see if you can 
change your perspective so instead of seeing the mountain from some vantage point, now 
you are the mountain. Feel that incredible solidity, that sense of dignity of the mountain 
in your posture. [pause 5 seconds] 
 And feel the weather, coming and going. See the weather, but don’t feel the need to 
analyze it. Feel it, but don’t push it away or grab it toward you. Feel your mind moving 
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and don’t try to change that either. You can drop the struggle; instead just let it all be 
[pause 6s]. 
See if you can notice the aches and pains in your body. Notice the pleasurable sensations, 
the painful sensations, and the non-sensations—the areas where you don’t feel anything, 
like the weather on the mountain. In other word, notice all of it, all the physical 
components of your experience of you body, as you notice the weather around you as the 
mountain. [pause 8s]. Feel these sensations—but don’t push them away or grab them in. 
Just let them be. 
See if you can now do the same thing with your thoughts. Your thoughts about whether 
you’re doing the exercise right. Your thoughts about whether the exercise is stupid, or 
good, incredibly boring – these coming, going thoughs. [3s] These thoughts are 
interesting enough and you can certainly explore them later. But for the moment, see if 
you can just let them be, without feeling any particular need to explore them, or get rid of 
them, or judge them, or otherwise with engage with them. Let them just be thoughts. No 
more no less. [pause 13s]. 
 Come back for a moment to visualize yourself as that strong, unchanging mountain. 
Feel your feet on the ground as the base of that mountain. Feel your spine as the center of 
that mountain. And feel the dignity as your shoulders sitting on that spine, like the crests 
of the mountain [pause 3s]. 
 And now, for the last part of this exercise, try to remember something that 
happened recently that got you quite upset. Take about 10s to think of this memory and 
try to remember the emotion associated with it [pause 8s]. Were you upset? Were you 
anxious? Were you angry? Were you sad?  
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 Whatever the emotion, or combination of emotions, try to remember how you felt it 
in your body. Notice any muscle tension associated with it. Notice the sensations, 
whether they’re hot or warm or prickly or empty or cold or whatever you feel. Take a 
moment to notice those sensations, a bit apart from the thoughts associated with your 
experience. Notice the physical sensations. Cold or hot? Sharp or dull? See if you can 
feel those sensations, without trying to change them. Feel your strong posture and let 
those physical sensations be [pause 10s]. 
And now, also notice the thoughts your mind is generating. Notice what you’re thinking 
about the experience. The judgments you’re having. The implications you’re setting out. 
The feeling of what you need to do. Thoughts about the present, about this exercise, 
about your comfort level; thoughts about the experience you were remembering a 
moment ago; thoughts about food or dinner. 
 These thoughts are all thoughts; components of your experience right now, no more 
and no less. So no matter what the thought, no matter how big, or dumb, or smart or 
small—important or not important—see if you can notice it simply as a thought, and let it 
be  
We often are captured by intense emotional experience. Sometimes this allows us 
to respond quickly and effectively in situations. However in other situations a really 
intense emotional response can get in the way of doing things that are really important to 
us. Take a moment to reflect on the experience you just had, where you saw your 
thoughts and physical sensations as simply a series of coming and going sensations, 
rather than fighting them or embracing them or ignoring them or whatever. You just let 
them be. 
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 I’ll ask if you can commit to taking this exercise with you through the rest of the 
study. See if you can commit to noticing the emotions, thoughts, and sensations that 
you’re having in all their varying textures and intensities, [pause 4s]  
 The idea is that seeing thoughts and emotions as a series of coming and going 
sensations in this way can help you notice when you’re having very strong emotions. 
Then you can decide how to act, rather than simply reacting without also thinking about 
what you’re doing. 
Before you open your eyes take a moment to gently picture the room around you [pause 
3s]. And then when you’re ready, you can open your eyes. 
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Self-Affirmation Intervention: 
  
 
 
[Prior to beginning the tape, the experimenter supplied the participant with a pen and 
blank paper, as well as a page with the list of values on the next page, from which the 
participant selected one value.] 
 What we’re going to try right now is an exercise where you are asked to write about 
something important to you—one of your most important values. The sheet the 
experimenter handed to you lists values that are held by many people.  
 Please take a bit of time to look at the list and think about what value you consider 
to be the most personally important.  
[pause 20s] 
 Have you selected a value? [pause 2s] Please circle it on the sheet.   
 Now, take some time to write about that value. This can be free form writing—you 
don’t need to organize it into a coherent essay. It’s more important to just get your ideas 
about what this value means to you on paper.  
 You can begin now. From time to time we’ll remind you to continue writing. 
 [Pause 5 minutes:] Just a reminder to please continue writing about what the value you 
selected means to you. 
 [Pause 5 minutes:] Just another reminder to please continue writing about what the value 
you selected means to you. 
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List of Values 
 
 
 
Please select one of the values from this list. 
 
business  
art–music–theater 
social life–relationships  
science–pursuit of knowledge 
religion–morality 
government–politics 
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Control Intervention: 
 
 
 
Note: This script was minimally adapted from information that was available at 
drexel.edu when the study was being organized. 
This tape will give you some information about Drexel University, including 
some fast, little known, facts about the school, the history of the school, and information 
about civic engagement in the university. In addition, we will provide information about 
Philadelphia that is particularly relevant to college students. 
First the fast facts: 
Drexel is a global research university and a leader in experiential learning. The 
school is among the top 100 in the nation. With 25,000 students, Drexel is one of 
America’s 15 largest private universities. 
Drexel has built its global reputation on core achievements that include: 
• Leadership in experiential learning through Drexel Co-op. 
• A history of academic technology firsts. 
• Recognition as a model of best practices in translational, use-inspired research. 
--Founded in 1891 in Philadelphia, Drexel now engages with students and communities 
around the world via: 
• Three Philadelphia campuses and other regional sites. 
• Drexel University Sacramento 
• The Academy of Natural Sciences of Drexel University, the nation’s oldest major 
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natural science museum and research organization. 
• International research partnerships including China and Israel. 
• Drexel Online, one of the oldest and most successful providers of online degree 
programs. 
Drexel is one of Philadelphia’s top 10 employers, and a major engine for 
economic development in the region. Drexel has committed to being the nation’s most 
civically engaged university, with community partnerships integrated into every aspect of 
service and academics. 
Drexel’s has developed an ongoing strategic plan named “Transforming the Modern 
Urban University,” which guides the University’s 21st-century trajectory. 
Now some history about the University: 
In founding Drexel University, Philadelphia financier and philanthropist Anthony 
J. Drexel launched a tradition of innovation. 
Mr. Drexel envisioned an institution of higher learning uniquely suited to the 
needs of a rapidly growing industrial society and of the young men and women seeking 
their place in it — core values that continue to guide the University in its modern era. 
Mr. Drexel’s vision was officially realized in 1891 with the establishment of the 
Drexel Institute of Art, Science and Industry. Originally a non-degree-granting 
institution, Drexel began conferring the bachelor of science degree in 1914, when its 18 
departments were organized into four schools. In 1927, the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania granted Drexel the privilege to confer the master of science degree, and in 
1965, the doctor of philosophy degree. 
The cornerstone of Drexel’s career preparation model has been the University's 
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co-operative education program. Introduced at Drexel in 1919 as one of the first models 
of its kind, the program has become integral to the University's educational experience. 
Through it, students alternate periods of study with periods of full-time professional 
employment, providing unrivaled, valuable professional experience. 
The institution's curriculum and organization of its academic programs have 
evolved to include nine colleges and four schools. In accord with this evolution, Drexel 
has undergone two changes in name, in 1936 becoming Drexel Institute of Technology 
and in 1970, Drexel University. The current title reflects the institution's commitment to 
research, as well as the breadth of its programs. 
Drexel's mission, services, and opportunities expanded further in April 2002 when 
MCP Hahnemann University — a major Philadelphia health sciences institution — 
became the Drexel University College of Medicine, College of Nursing and Health 
Professions, and School of Public Health. In May 2011, the University established an 
affiliation with one of Philadelphia’s most storied institutions, the Academy of Natural 
Sciences. These historic events have extended the resources of Drexel and led to many 
productive synergies in teaching and research. 
Drexel’s foundation as an innovating institution has established the university as a 
national leader in higher education. In 1983, Drexel became the nation's first university to 
require all undergraduates to have personal access to a microcomputer for use in all of 
their coursework. The university continued its commitment to integrating technology 
when it became the first university to operate a fully wireless campus in 2000. In 2006, 
Drexel became the first major research university to open a new law school in 25 years 
and is one of only two universities operating law schools that follow a co-operative 
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model of learning. 
Through all of the changes and evolution, Drexel's core mission has held constant. 
Since its founding, the institution has remained a privately controlled, nonsectarian, 
coeducational center of higher learning, distinguished by a commitment to preparing men 
and women for success in their chosen careers. Its greatly expanded enrollment, 
campuses, and curriculum reflect a history of responsiveness to societal and individual 
needs — all of which Mr. Drexel sought to address in his day. 
 
  We’ll now discuss Drexel’s commitment to civic engagement: 
Drexel is committed to becoming “the most civically engaged university in the 
United States,” according to President John A. Fry. 
The University supports engagement along three dimensions: research and 
academic programs that directly benefit communities, public service by students and 
faculty, and business practices that support local and regional economic development. 
Drexel’s engagement is long-term and multi-generational, and is fundamental to the 
University’s mission, heritage and future. 
The effort begins with Drexel’s transformative commitment to Powelton Village and 
Mantua, the neighborhoods alongside its University City Campus. Drexel’s future and the 
future of its neighbors are inexorably linked. And civic engagement not only unites 
neighborhoods, it educates students in problem solving, understanding diversity, good 
citizenship, and leadership. Drexel is solving real problems and making a difference in 
the lives of our students and our neighbors. 
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In 2009, the Coalition of Urban and Metropolitan Universities named Drexel one 
of the top 10 institutions for community service in its report, “Saviors of Our Cities: 
Survey of Best College and University Civic Partnerships.” 
Drexel’s vision of a comprehensive and progressive urban university striving to 
be the most civically engaged in the nation comes to life through the Lindy Center for 
Civic Engagement. 
In collaboration with the community, and in support of Drexel’s strategic plan, the Lindy 
Center furthers the public good on the local and national levels while enriching the 
scholarship and character of Drexel students. 
The Lindy Center works with more than 75 community partners on 200-plus civic 
engagement projects annually. The Center’s personnel also lead several student 
leadership programs, and support community-based learning through course development 
and faculty research projects. 
Sparked by the generosity and insight of benefactor Philip B. Lindy, the Center’s 
initiatives include: 
• The Lindy Neighbors Program, which is dedicated to optimizing health and wellness 
education in the West Philadelphia community and matching Drexel students with 
non-profits and businesses to help build capacity and provide ongoing support. 
• The Lindy Scholars Program, which matches 75 Drexel students each year with 225 
sixth- through eighth-grade students for after-school tutoring and mentoring 
sessions, and engages families through workshops and teachers through 
professional development. 
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The Certificate in Civic Engagement, which provides Drexel students with the 
intellectual grounding to be active participants in their communities on issues of public 
concern. The Certificate puts Drexel in the small but growing number of colleges and 
universities across the nation with an academic civic engagement program, offering 
courses on active citizenship, university-community partnerships, and civic engagement 
leadership. 
Drexel’s Neighborhood Initiatives provide a long-term strategy to improve the 
quality of life in Powelton Village and Mantua, the neighborhoods adjacent to campus. 
In partnership with its neighbors, the University invests in public safety and 
security, homeownership, retail and the arts, economic development, community 
enrichment, and education. Those investments have laid the groundwork for a 
transformational commitment on the part of Drexel’s faculty, students, trustees, and 
administration. 
Drexel’s approach aligns its academic expertise and culture of public service with 
wide-ranging institutional investments to create a collaborative and coordinated strategy. 
The effort is comprehensive, addressing key areas that strengthen the community. Drexel 
works closely with residents, nonprofits, city agencies, and corporate and foundation 
partners to bring new opportunities to the neighborhood. 
The goals of Drexel’s Neighborhood Initiatives include: 
• A clean, safe, and sustainable neighborhood, with expanded security patrol boundaries 
and increased investment in safety infrastructure. 
• Improved economic opportunities, through economic development initiatives that 
provide new opportunities for neighborhood residents. 
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• Stronger educational options for the community, with partnerships with neighborhood 
public schools. 
• Greater access to health and wellness resources for families and residents. 
• A livable and affordable residential community, supported by housing programs like 
the Employee Home Purchase Assistance Program to encourage owner 
occupancy. 
Private/public partnerships to create vibrant retail and commercial corridors near campus. 
Now some information Philadelphia, the university’s home city. 
WHETHER YOU’RE A HISTORY BUFF, A SPORTS FAN OR A FINE-ARTS 
AFICIONADO, THERE’S A LITTLE SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE IN 
PHILADELPHIA. 
Drexel University’s lively urban campus is located in one of America’s most 
exciting cities—Philadelphia. In a world-class city for business, art, and education, 
Philadelphia’s skyscrapers are coupled with a blend of distinct and culturally diverse 
neighborhoods, creating a unique metropolitan yet intimate urban experience. 
Surrounded by tree-lined residential blocks just minutes away from Philadelphia’s 
downtown Center City district, Drexel makes its home in the neighborhood of University 
City. Comprised of five additional universities and dotted by coffee shops, restaurants, 
shops and farmers markets, University City is just one of the many reasons Philadelphia 
makes an ideal place for students to live, play and learn. 
A MECCA FOR ARTS AND CULTURE 
It’s no wonder Philadelphia is known for its expansive murals and abundance of 
cheesesteaks—it’s a city with a deep appreciation for the arts and culture. But with a 
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thriving shopping and nightlife scene, an eclectic spectrum of art galleries, boutiques and 
museums, and a restaurant scene revered by both five-star chefs and underground 
foodies, there’s much more to Philadelphia than its legendary icons. 
A BURGEONING HUB FOR INNOVATION 
Philadelphia, a city steeped in tradition, is sprouting roots as one of the nation’s 
most up-and-coming hubs for innovation, technology and economic growth. Home to 
such powerhouse companies such as Comcast and Urban Outfitters—as well as a quickly 
growing number of energetic start-ups—Philadelphia is a natural fit for Drexel’s dynamic 
community. 
A CITY RICH WITH HISTORY 
Home to national symbols such as the Liberty Bell, the Betsy Ross House and 
Independence Hall, Philadelphia is brimming with relics from many of the nation’s most 
significant milestones. From the city’s 18th century architecture to the countless 
institutions bearing Benjamin Franklin’s namesake, it’s easy to see why Philadelphia 
earned the nickname “America’s Birthplace.” 
A DIFFERENT TYPE OF COLLEGE TOWN 
With more than 90 colleges and universities in the city and surrounding region, 
Philadelphia is a great place to be a college student. Spend an evening at Citizens Bank 
Park with your classmates for Phillies College Nights, or enjoy discounted tickets from 
city institutions like the Philadelphia Orchestra and the Pennsylvania Ballet. Whatever 
your pastime, there are plenty of resources for university students to make their home 
away from home in Philadelphia. 
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Thanks for this listening to this informational tape about Drexel University. We hope 
you’ve learned a few things about the information you were not previously aware of. 
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Appendix C: Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
DV1: Intent-to-change Behavior 
Instructions: Please rate how much you anticipate changing your sexual behavior, from 
this point forward, on the following scale. You may use any number between 1 and 100. 
<1 “I will not change this behavior at all” -------------------------------------------------------- 
25 “I will do this 25% more than I currently do.”------------------------------------------------ 
50 “I will do this 50% more than I currently do.” ----------------------------------------------- 
75 – “I will do this 75% more than I currently do.”----------------------------------------------- 
100 – “From now on I will only do this.”> 
OR enter NOT APPLICABLE [or “n/a”], if a) the question refers to a type of sexual 
activity you have not done or do not anticipate doing in the future, or b) if the question 
refers to a type of protection and you currently use protection 100% of the time.  
 
• I will use condoms while having vaginal or anal sex with someone other than a 
long-term partner in a monogamous relationship.  _________ 
• I will use protection (such as having my partner wear a condom or using a dental 
dam) while performing oral sex with someone other than a long-term partner in a 
monogamous relationship. _________ 
• I will not have vaginal or anal sex during periods in which I am not seeing 
someone exclusively. _________ 
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• I will not have sex during periods in which I am not in a long-term relationship. 
_________ 
• I will not perform unprotected oral sex during hook-ups. _________ 
• I will casually hook up less often. _________  
• I will not have anal or vaginal sex during casual hook-ups. _________ 
• I will get tested for STIs. _________ 
• I will ask future partners to get STI tested before having sex. _________ 
• I will refuse to have sex with someone until they get an STI test. _________ 
• I will not have vaginal or anal sex. _________ 
• I will not have oral sex. _________ 
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DV2: Recall of Information from Article 
 
 
 
(answers in parentheses below each item) 
1.) What percent of genital herpes carriers do not know they have the infection? 
a. 40% 
b. 65% 
c. 80% 
d. 85% 
(d) 
2.) Slightly more than _____ people in the United States have an STI. 
a. 20% 
b. 25% 
c. 33% 
d. 40% 
e. 36% 
(c) 
3.) 21 – 24 year olds are at greater risk for STI infection than 18 – 20 year olds. 
a. True 
b. False 
c. This information was not contained in the article 
(c) 
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4.) About _____ of new STI infections occur among 15 – 24 year olds. 
a. 50% 
b. 40% 
c. 45% 
d. 30% 
e. 35% 
(a) 
5.) Condoms reduce the risk of genital herpes by _____.   
a. 80% 
b. 75% 
c. 70% 
d. 50% 
e.  60% 
 (d) 
6.) Gonhorrea increased between ________ from 2011 to 2012? 
a. 6 – 14% 
b. 3 – 9% 
c. 2 – 8% 
d. 4 – 10%  
(d) 
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DV3: Estimated Risk 
 
 
 
(1) I will contract chlamydia.  
(2) I will contract HPV.  
(3) I will get cancer, as a result of having contracted chlamydia.  
(4) A (former or current) sexual partner will have a serious long-term health issue 
that is a result of an STI I gave him/her. 
(5) I will contract genital herpes. 
(6) I will contract HIV. 
(7) A close friend, family member, or I will die of AIDS. 
(8) I will contract gonorrhea. 
(9) I will contract an incurable STI. 
(10) My life will be impaired, for 6 months or more, due to an STI I contracted.
  
 
 
